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Abstract of Thesis 
 
SINGLE EVENT UPSET DETECTION IN FIELD PROGRAMMABLE GATE 
ARRAYS 
 
 
 
The high-radiation environment in space can lead to anomalies in normal satellite 
operation. A major cause of concern to spacecraft-designers is the single event upset 
(SEU). SEUs can result in deviations from expected component behavior and are capable 
of causing irreversible damage to hardware. In particular, Field Programmable Gate 
Arrays (FPGAs) are known to be highly susceptible to SEUs. Radiation-hardened 
versions of such devices are associated with an increase in power consumption and cost 
in addition to being technologically inferior when compared to contemporary 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) parts. This thesis consequently aims at exploring the 
option of using COTS FPGAs in satellite payloads. A framework is developed, allowing 
the SEU susceptibility of such a device to be studied. SEU testing is carried out in a 
software-simulated fault environment using a set of Java classes called JBits. A radiation 
detector module, to measure the radiation backdrop of the device, is also envisioned as 
part of the final design implementation.  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
Advancement in space technology has prompted a significant effort to be dedicated 
towards understanding and characterizing the effects of ionizing radiation. Apart from the 
hazards such radiation poses to humans, the errors that it induces in electronic devices 
and circuits can lead to abnormalities in critical spacecraft modules. Such effects have 
been observed in the past in endeavors like Voyager-1 and the Hubble Space Telescope 
[1] [55] and have been the motivation for several projects aimed at preventing similar 
occurrences in future. 
  
 
Figure 1: A Commercial Pancake-Type Geiger-Müller Probe 
 
Radiation in space can arise from sources such as cosmic rays, the Van Allen radiation 
belts, solar phenomena etc. and can be measured by means of sensors like Geiger-Müller 
(GM) tubes or semiconductor detectors. These devices can detect different types of 
radiation and can also measure attributes such as the dose amount or particle energy 
levels. Figure 1 shows a commercial radiation detector from United Nuclear™ that is 
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capable of measuring alpha, beta and gamma radiation. The sensing element consists of a 
pancake-type GM detector. 
1.1.1 Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) 
FPGAs are semiconductor devices that can be user-programmed with a logic function. 
The function can range from common structures such as arithmetic logic units or 
microprocessors to custom application-specific logic. Their inherent re-programmability 
feature has been fully exploited for prototyping purposes. The FPGA architecture, that 
makes all this possible, consists of two key functional blocks – the configurable logic 
block (CLB) and a switch matrix that forms the interconnections between them. Some 
devices can also contain additional blocks such as an Input Output Block (IOB) that acts 
as an interface between the device and the package pins. The block diagram of a typical 
FPGA (Virtex™ II from Xilinx™) is shown in Figure 2 [31]. 
 
 
Figure 2: FPGA Block Diagram [31] 
 
The CLB is the heart of the FPGA, and it normally consists of look-up tables (LUTs) and 
other low-level logic elements such as logic gates, storage elements, multiplexers 
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(MUXs) etc. The CLB in case of a Virtex II FPGA for instance, consists of 2 tri-state 
buffers and 4 similar slices with each slice containing a pair each of 4-input function 
generators, carry logic, multiplexers, storage elements and a few logic gates, shown in 
Figure 3 [31]. The function generators can be configured as either one of a 4-input LUT, 
a 16-bit distributed SelectRAM, or a 16-bit shift register. CLBs are arranged in the form 
of an array with the programmable interconnects (switch matrix) providing the necessary 
connections between different blocks based on the implemented function. Other than 
these, devices can also contain blocks to facilitate design development such as random 
access memory (RAM) structures, multipliers, clock managers or sometimes even high-
end structures such as microprocessors. 
 
 
Figure 3: CLB Slice for the Virtex II [31] 
 
The flow one usually follows in order to program an FPGA with a desired logic design 
can be divided into three steps. The design is first created using a hardware description 
language such as Verilog or VHDL. This is then utilized in generating a low-level device 
specific bitstream file. The final step is to download the bitstream onto the configuration 
memory of the FPGA, which individually defines the behavior of the CLBs and 
corresponding interconnects needed to implement the design. The configuration memory 
can be based on static RAM (SRAM), flash or antifuse structures. Other than the 
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configuration memory, the device also consists of user memory which is used to store 
design-related data such as register states. 
 
FPGAs have gained popularity in recent years particularly in aerospace applications. One 
of the major reasons being the prospect of performing post-launch design optimizations 
or changes in spacecraft objectives. Present line of commercial FPGAs are capable of 
integrating powerful embedded processors and several common intellectual property 
cores that provide a complete system-on-chip solution. FPGAs that contain dedicated 
multiplier blocks are particularly suited as co-processors for computation-intensive 
applications such as digital signal processing. A good example is the Virtex 5 which is 
the latest in the Virtex series of FPGAs. The device shown in Figure 4 is built on a 65 nm 
process and includes 288 dedicated DSP blocks, each block consisting of a 25 bit x 18 bit 
multiplier and a 48 bit adder/subtractor/accumulator.  Other features include 4 embedded 
Ethernet MAC blocks capable of implementing 1000 Base-X (Gigabit Ethernet) 
implementation, and a dedicated block that provides PCI-Express functionality [3]. 
 
 
Figure 4: The Virtex 5 FPGA 
 
1.1.2 The Single Event Upset (SEU) Problem 
A particularly prominent effect of radiation pertaining to electronics is the SEU, 
identified as a change in state occurring when a high-energy particle collides against a 
sensitive node of a micro-electronic device. These changes in voltage levels can in-turn 
lead to potentially destructive events such as latch-ups. Recent advancements in the 
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semiconductor industry have led to the fabrication of highly scaled devices. These 
devices exhibit an increased sensitivity to SEUs due to a reduced feature size and a 
proportional increase in device density.  
 
In the case of programmable logic devices such as FPGAs, SEU effects can be much 
more severe. Since FPGAs utilize a configuration memory array to define the logic 
function, an SEU occurring in a single bit in the array can lead to an unexpected 
alteration of the original design. The SRAM structure in particular, that commonly forms 
the configuration memory of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) FPGAs, is known to be 
highly susceptible to SEUs [2]. Hence certain accommodations need to be made in order 
to use these devices for space applications.The industry solution to SEUs is radiation-
hardening. These enhanced devices are basically derived from similar commercial 
versions with the underlying difference usually lying in the manufacturing technology or 
in the implementation of redundant logic to counter SEU events. The downsides of using 
such radiation-hardened devices are:  
 
• These devices consume more power 
• Are more expensive 
• Are typically slower than the commercial version 
• Have a reduced effective design area 
 
Moreover, while hardening can reduce the occurrence of SEUs, the device is not 
completely immune to them. This argument particularly holds true for rad-hardened 
versions based on the SRAM architecture of COTS technologies [5]. To elucidate the 
tradeoffs involved with hardening, a comparison is provided in Table 1 between a rad-
hardened Virtex II QPro FPGA (XQR2V1000) and its commercial counterpart, the Virtex 
II FPGA (XC2V1000). The first significant point to note is that the QPro was released 
more than 3 years later with no significant design changes. To provide a better basis for 
assessment the Virtex 4 device, released in the same year as the QPro, is also included in 
the comparison. 
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Table 1: Comparison between Radiation-Hardened and Commercial FPGAs 
 Virtex II QPro Virtex II Virtex 4 
Device and Package Type 
XQR2V1000-4 
BG5751
XC2V1000-6  
BG575 
XC4VLX25-12 
FF6682
Release Date May, 2004 Jan, 2001 [4] Sep, 2004 
Process Technology 150 nm 150 nm 90 nm 
Bitstream size 3,753,432 bits 4,082,592 bits 7,819,520 bits 
Core Power Supply Voltage 
(VCCINT) 
1.5 V 1.5 V 1.2 V 
Quiescent VCCINT Supply 
Current (ICCINTQ) 
100 mA (Typical) 
 500 mA (Max) 
12 mA (Typical) 
 250 mA (Max) 
77 mA (Typical) 
N/A  (Max) 
DCM3 Max Input Clock 
Frequency (using DLL4) 
360 MHz 450 MHz 500 MHz 
Available I/Os 328 328 448 
Size 31 mm x 31 mm 31 mm x 31 mm 27 mm x 27 mm 
Price5 $4,091.00 $446.00 $462.50 
 
Notes: 
1. BG –  Standard Ball Grid Array (BGA) 
2. FF –  Flip-Chip Fine-Pitch BGA 
3. DCM – Digital Clock Manager 
4. DLL – Delay-Locked Loop 
5. Prices from NuHorizons™ and Avnet™ 
 
Though built to be structurally similar to the Virtex II, the QPro still shows some 
discrepancies, such as a smaller bitstream size and higher power consumption. A higher 
speed grade was used for the Virtex II (-6) to emphasize the fact that the QPro has only 
one speed option (-4). Also notice how the QPro compares to the Virtex 4 that has more 
than twice the number of configuration bits translating to more logic resources. It should 
be mentioned here that the XC4VLX25 is one of the lower end versions of the Virtex 4. 
Finally the rad-hardened device is nearly 10 times more expensive making it unsuitable 
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for low-budget projects. Thus several applications might find it more practical to use 
COTS FPGAs. 
 
The application of this work is in determining the feasibility of using these devices in 
spacecraft systems. Although the associated benefits of COTS devices make them 
attractive options, their higher vulnerability to SEUs makes it necessary to incorporate 
fault recovery techniques. The mechanism employed here makes use of the FPGA 
readback/reconfiguration features to achieve this. Also, in our case these functions will be 
implemented by a microcontroller hence the unit that manages the process needs to be 
deployable on an embedded platform. For this purpose a set of Java classes known as the 
JBits Application Programming Interface (API) was selected. JBits provides the 
capability of designing and/or modifying circuits for Xilinx Virtex devices. Apart from 
inheriting the advantages of Java, a useful feature of JBits is that it can be used to 
examine and even configure individual FPGA CLBs. The main requirement to run JBits 
is a Java Virtual Machine (JVM). Several implementations of the JVM have been 
specifically customized for microcontrollers and could therefore be used to execute it. 
Santiago Leon from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University was able to 
successfully run JBits on a LEON RISC processor through the Waba JVM [7]. 
 
1.2 Objective 
The motivation behind this work is to incorporate a COTS FPGA in a satellite payload to 
determine its behavior in high-radiation space environments, i.e. its exhibited SEU rate. 
A radiation detector was also included in the design so as to be able to quantify the SEU 
counts based on the surrounding radiation levels.  
 
The main aim of this thesis is to develop the framework for the major sections of the 
payload and thereby aid in the final implementation.  The first section namely the 
radiation detector module requires the selection of a suitable sensor. GM tubes as well as 
other popular sensor options will be examined, describing their operating mechanisms 
and typical characteristics. The second section is the SEU module that will monitor the 
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FPGA for SEU instances and consequently remove them by applying mitigation 
techniques. The JBits package chosen herein plays two major roles in this work. The first, 
and what originally prompted its selection, is in simulating the SEUs. Since the cost for 
using a cyclotron facility is particularly high, the faults are injected by directly modifying 
the bitstream and performing a run-time reconfiguration. The second function is in 
identifying and correcting any occurring SEUs in the bitstream. This is done by 
performing a readback whenever the logic on the FPGA detects an SEU, recording the 
bits that were affected, and reconfiguring the device with the correct bitstream. A test 
environment was developed for this intent that made use of the Xilinx Virtex-II 
Evaluation Board from Avnet™, populated with a Virtex-II FPGA. Details on the setup 
will be given in a later chapter. 
 
1.3 Thesis Outline 
Chapter 2 of this thesis introduces the CubeSat standard along with the Kentucky 
Satellite (KySat) project. An overview of the proposed system for the final design is also 
given in a later section. Chapter 3 describes the major radiation sources that are likely to 
affect the payload and examines several commonly used radiation detectors. Chapter 4 
explains SEU concepts and various factors that can generate them.  The effects that SEUs 
tend to have on FPGAs are then presented along with a list of applicable mitigation 
strategies. JBits makes use of the Xilinx HardWare InterFace (XHWIF) to communicate 
with the board. Chapter 5 is thus dedicated to explaining the process used in creating this 
interface and the components involved therein. The testing methodology that was 
followed to generate and consequently detect faults in the FPGA bitstream is then 
provided in Chapter 6. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the thesis along with suggestions 
for future improvements. 
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Chapter 2  
System Overview 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The final payload implementation is expected to be carried out for a CubeSat class 
satellite. This chapter describes these satellites along with their main features. This is 
followed by a description of the overall system. 
 
2.2 The CubeSat Standard 
The CubeSat standard was designed at Stanford University and California Polytechnic 
State University (Cal Poly), and defines electrical, structural, operational, and testing 
specifications for a 1 kg, 10 cm cube-shaped satellite dubbed as a CubeSat [40]. Alternate 
designs utilizing double (2 kg) or even triple (3 kg) configurations can also be used. The 
launch is managed by Cal Poly by means of a standardized deployment system known as 
the Poly Picosatellite Orbital Deployer (P-POD). The P-POD can carry up to three single 
CubeSats and acts as the interface between the launch vehicle and the CubeSats. Its main 
purpose is to ease integration into any launch vehicle. This allows the CubeSats to be 
deployed as secondary or tertiary payloads at a lower cost. 
 
CubeSats are typically launched in a Low-Earth Orbit and have become a popular low-
cost option particularly for university missions. The community consists of over 80 
universities and corporations world-wide with several companies providing off-the-shelf 
components to facilitate CubeSat designs.  
 
A possible candidate for carrying the payload described in this work is the Kentucky 
Satellite (KySat). KySat is a state-wide effort by universities in Kentucky, to provide 
rapid access to space for small payloads. KySat1 is planned as the first of many launches 
 9
expected to have more ambitious payloads and spacecraft bus capabilities. The payload 
on KySat1 consists of a VGA camera and an experimental S-Band radio for high-
bandwidth communication. It is expected to be launched in 2008 and while further details 
on its orbit are not available at present, certain passage over Kentucky rules out orbits 
with inclinations less than 40 degrees.  The active lifespan of the satellite is expected to 
be 18 months, though it will remain in orbit for approx. 10-15 years [40].  
 
 
Figure 5: KySat1 
 
2.3 System Overview 
A basic block diagram for the envisioned system is given in Figure 6. A discussion of the 
individual sections along with the expected dataflow between them ensues. 
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Figure 6: System Block Diagram 
 
2.3.1 Detector Subsection 
This subsection will consist of one of the radiation detectors that will be discussed later 
on. Each of the sensors has their own strengths and the selection will need to be based on 
optimality towards fulfillment of mission goals. For instance, GM tubes provide a simple 
and robust solution, in addition to being cost-effective, while solid-state detectors such as 
PIN diodes offer a much better resolution and are also able to provide a measure of the 
incident particle energy.  
2.3.2 SEU Subsection 
The device under test (DUT) for the SEU module will consist of a Virtex II FPGA. A 
Virtex II Pro was initially considered but it contained several enhanced features that were 
deemed unnecessary for our current requirements. Another reason that had prompted this 
change was that JBits has not yet been implemented for this series. The DUT will be 
programmed with a logic function to detect SEU events. The simplest approach consists 
of two identical logic slices that are fed with the same test pattern. Their outputs are then 
constantly compared for mismatches occurring due to SEUs.  
 
An additional PROM will also be required to store the bitstreams needed for 
configuration and SEU detection/correction. FPGA configuration can either be 
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completely managed by the microcontroller, or it can alternatively be configured directly 
from the PROM. The second method can be faster especially if done via a parallel 
SelectMAP interface, and can be employed during power-up or in cases when power 
cycling is required to correct the errors.  
2.3.3 Detection Unit CPU 
A principal requirement for the microcontroller selected as the CPU for the SEU and 
Detector Subsections is that it should have sufficient memory to be able to run JBits. This 
includes memory for the JVM implementation and the underlying real-time operating 
system. Part of the code can also reside in the PROM. The primary functions of the 
microcontroller will be to generate a measure of the radiation based on the sensor output, 
and to detect and count the number of SEU events, optionally recording the bits that were 
affected. These can then be transmitted to the ground-station as data packets along with a 
timestamp. 
2.3.4 Flight Computer 
This block will be the CPU for the main payload of the satellite and will control most of 
the system operations. These will for example include tasks such as management of the 
power system, communication radio, etc. For KySat1, the power system consists of a 
solar cell array as the primary power source along with a backup battery supply. 
Communication with the ground-station is established through a UHF and VHF antenna 
for transmitting and receiving respectively. More information on the implementation can 
be found in [40]. The data on the radio com-link from our perspective will typically 
consist of:  
 
• Commands from the ground-station. 
• Periodic or on-demand updates on the SEU count. 
• Periodic or on-demand transmission of the measured particle count and/or 
absorbed radiation dose. 
• Periodic transmission of system status information. 
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Chapter 3  
Radiation Detector Options 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will study the most common radiation detectors describing their concept of 
operation and features. However, before proceeding it is essential to be aware of the 
radiation setting that the payload is to be deployed in. 
   
3.2 Space Radiation Environment 
The radiation environment in space is affected by several elements and the type of orbit, 
altitude, and inclination of the payload decide which of these play an important role 
during its active time in space. Apart from their function in detector dose measurements, 
these sources are also important from an SEU perspective as will be discussed in the 
following chapter.  The payload in our case is expected to be launched at a Low Earth 
Orbit (LEO), defined by NASA as an orbit that extends from 80 km – 2,000 km above 
the earth’s surface [46]. Other common orbits include: 
 
• Medium Earth Orbit (MEO): Orbits that lie between 2,000 km to 35,786 km. 
• Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO): Orbits at an altitude of 35,786 km having a 
period equal to the earth’s rotational period. 
• Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO): Orbits with a low perigee of approx. 1,000 km 
and an apogee of 35,786 km. Their inclination is typically between 50 and 70 
degrees. 
3.2.1 The Van Allen Radiation Belts 
The Van Allen Belts are composed of two toroidal bands of energetic particles trapped 
due to the earth’s magnetosphere, shown in Figure 7. The inner belt extends from 1,000 
 13
km – 10,000 km and consists mainly of high-energy protons while the outer belt, made 
predominantly from trapped electrons believed to have been injected from the solar wind, 
lies at an altitude of about 15,000 km – 30, 000 km [8]. The gap between the two belts, 
designated as the ‘safe zone’ or the ‘Van Allen Belt slot’, has a much lower particle count 
and is particularly significant to satellites having MEOs. The zone is created by particle 
interactions with radio waves generated from lightning. This process reduces the particle 
energy, eventually resulting in their harmlessly dissipating in the earth’s atmosphere. 
 
 Inner Belt Outer Belt 
Figure 7: The Van Allen Radiation Belts 
 
 
 
Figure 8: The Explorer I Satellite Launching on a Redstone-Jupiter C Rocket [9] 
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The inner belt was first discovered by Explorer I and later confirmed by Explorer III. 
Both missions were launched by NASA in 1958 under Dr. James Van Allen. The outer 
belt was later discovered in the same year by Pioneer III [47]. All three missions used a 
Geiger-Müller (GM) tube as the radiation detector. 
 
Though the earth's atmosphere restricts the belts from directly affecting surface life, their 
effects are still visible. The Aurorae Borealis (Northern Lights) for instance are caused 
due to the trapped particles (electrons) entering the earth’s atmosphere through the 
geomagnetic tail, which is the region of the belts closest to the earth. The electrons impart 
energy through collisions to atmospheric elements that in-turn release the energy as light. 
Emission from oxygen for example is green, while nitrogen emits a reddish glow. 
 
Radioactive neutrons generated by collision of cosmic rays with the atmosphere, decay 
and produce protons as by-products forming the inner belt. The AE-8/AP-8 Trapped 
Particle Flux Maps from NASA [11] estimate the particle energies in the belts to be 0.04 
MeV – 7 MeV for electrons and 0.1 MeV – 400 MeV for protons. These flux maps have 
been the standard used by spacecraft designers for several decades now. Known 
limitations exist however and thus a new AE-9/AP-9 model is currently being developed 
by NASA and several other partners. The new model will include ions and is expected to 
cover particles with a broader energy range [44].  
 
The particle fluxes can fluctuate due to effects from solar events such as flares or from 
man-made causes (nuclear explosions). These can at times even introduce artificial 
radiation belts. A classic example of one such incident and the damage caused therein is 
Starfish Prime, a nuclear test conducted by the United States on July 9, 1962. The test, 
occurring at an altitude of 400 km, inserted an artificial belt of high-energy electrons (up 
to 7 MeV) into the inner Van Allen belt. Effects of the belt were observable for five 
years, nearly eight years in some areas [16]. Several satellites failed as a result of the 
unexpected increase in radiation [12]: 
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• Ariel I (US/UK) 
Ariel I, launched in April 1962, was a satellite designed by NASA to carry six British 
payloads to study the relationship between the ionosphere and solar radiation. Four 
days after the explosion its operation became irregular due to the accelerated 
degradation of its solar cells caused by the electrons from the belt. Other effects 
included overloading of the cosmic ray particle counter circuitry and a consequent 
weakening of the detector [13].  
• Transit 4B (US) 
Transit 4B was a US Navy navigation satellite launched in November 1961. It 
stopped transmitting 25 days following the test due to a sharp decrease in solar cell 
output. 
• TRAAC (US) 
The Transit Research and Attitude Control (TRAAC) satellite was launched on the 
same launch vehicle as the Transit 4B to test gravity-gradient stabilization in Transit 
satellites. It also shared the same fate as the Transit 4B, failing to transmit 38 days 
after the explosion due to solar cell degradation. 
• Injun I (US)  
Built to study the natural and artificial radiation belts, auroras, and other geophysical 
phenomena, Injun I was launched in June 1961. Its active transmission ended in 
March 1963, longer than the other 3 satellites, owing to a power supply designed to 
withstand higher degradation [14]. 
• Cosmos V (Russia)  
It was launched in May 1962, to study the upper layers of the earth’s atmosphere, and 
was used to collect data from the artificial belt for a period of 4 months. Only indirect 
information is provided on the power sources of the satellite. 
• Telstar I (US) 
Telstar I was the first active, direct relay communications satellite, and was launched 
in July 1962 on the day following the Starfish blast. It was designed by Bell 
Laboratories and funded by AT&T. An increase in radiation intensity caused from 
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Starfish and a Russian nuclear test in October 1962 led to the failure of some 
transistors in the command system and it stopped responding in November 1962. 
Although a workaround managed to reactivate the satellite, the transmitter could only 
handle intermittent transmissions before finally failing on February 21, 1963 [15]. 
 
There are numerous instances of satellite failures induced by the radiation belts and those 
mentioned above only demonstrated the ones that were specifically due to Starfish. An 
upside of the Van Allen belts is that they provide some level of protection against solar 
winds and cosmic rays by limiting the number of particle collisions instigated by them in 
the atmosphere. 
3.2.2 Cosmic Rays 
Cosmic rays consist of energetic particles that originate from outside the earth’s 
atmosphere. They were discovered in 1912 by Victor Hess. He measured the background 
ionization rate on a balloon and found that it increased with altitude, concluding that this 
was due to radiation from sources outside the atmosphere, later named ‘cosmic rays’. 
Cosmic rays comprise: 
 
• Galactic Cosmic Rays (GCRs): They consist of particles originating from outside 
the solar system. 
• Anomalous Cosmic Rays (ACRs): These are particles originating from within the 
interstellar space in the heliosheath. 
• Solar Energetic Particles: They are generated from solar events such as solar 
flares. 
 
This section will only deal with GCRs, since ACR particles have comparatively lower 
energies and speeds. Solar energetic particles will be studied in the following sections. 
 
GCRs are composed of approximately 90% (hydrogen) protons, 9% alpha particles 
(helium) and 1% ionized nuclei of various elements. About 1% of cosmic rays particles 
consist of electrons. Ions of elements having an atomic number (Z) 1 ≤ Z ≤ 92 are known 
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to be present in these rays [17]. Still, most of the ions are from lighter elements such as 
hydrogen, helium, and to a lesser degree carbon and oxygen. Particles from heavier 
elements (Z>25) such as iron are comparatively rare but nonetheless present. Despite 
their lower fluxes, when compared to trapped particles, GCRs still possess high 
penetrating properties due to their energy levels and are hence hostile towards 
electronics. Particles can have energies ranging in hundreds of GeV and some have 
energies well over that range. In fact the highest energy that was ever recorded for a 
single cosmic ray particle was in 1991, by the Fly’s Eye cosmic ray detector of the 
University of Utah, and was approx. 3x1020 eV [18]. Particles with such high energies are 
believed to originate from outside the Milky Way as opposed to the majority of GCRs. 
 
GCRs are energized while they are traveling through interstellar matter. On top of getting 
ionized during this passage, the particles are also accelerated several times, probably by 
supernova remnants to nearly the velocity of light [48]. Constant deflections from 
magnetic fields scatter the particles evenly in all directions. This effectively makes it 
impossible to determine the direction of their origin. Particles that are not fully ionized 
before they reach the earth’s magnetosphere have a higher penetrating power. The earth’s 
magnetic field can provide some degree of protection against GCRs to spacecrafts 
depending on their inclination and altitude. The poles, however, are vulnerable on 
account of the shape of the field lines. Like the trapped radiation belts, GCRs are also 
affected by solar cycles with the particle level being lowest during solar maximum, and 
reaching climax during solar minimum. 
3.2.3 Solar Wind 
The solar wind is the plasma of charged particles, namely electrons, protons and heavy 
ions that originate from the Sun’s corona. Its existence was first hinted at by the fact that 
comet tails always pointed away from the Sun irrespective of the comet’s direction of 
motion. Ludwig Biermann from Germany suggested that this was due to a stream of 
particles emitted by the Sun or ‘solar corpuscular radiation’ [49]. In 1958, Eugene Parker 
of the University of Chicago while studying the coronal processes coined the term ‘solar 
wind’ for this flow [50]. The extremely hot temperature of the Sun continuously heats the 
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particles in the corona up to a point where they are capable of escaping from the Sun’s 
gravitational pull. The high temperature results in a regulated plasma stream that travels 
radially outward along the Sun’s magnetic field lines. The Sun’s rotation keeps the flow 
of the wind continuous. Figure 9 shows the motion of solar wind through interplanetary 
space. 
 
 
Figure 9: The Solar Wind [10] 
 
The composition of the solar wind resembles the element distribution of the Sun with 
approx. 95% protons and the remaining 5% formed by helium and lesser doses of oxygen 
and other elements. An equal number of electrons, also present, balance out the positive 
charge. The particles are discharged by the Sun in all directions at energies of approx. 0.5 
– 2 KeV/nucleon. They have extremely high speeds ranging from 300 km/s over 
streamers to 900 km/s over coronal holes (dark regions), with an average of about 400 
km/s (nearly 106 mph) [10]. Solar events such as coronal mass ejections and solar flares 
cause disturbances in the wind and can result in an increase in charged particle density 
and energy levels through geomagnetic storms. Apart from interfering with radio signals 
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and an increased probability of satellite charging, an increased drag from such storms can 
result in LEO satellites prematurely re-entering the atmosphere. 
3.2.4 Solar Flares and Coronal Mass Ejections 
Solar flares are tremendous explosions occurring on the surface of the Sun. They are 
caused due to the abrupt release of energy in magnetically active regions around 
sunspots. The energy discharge is accompanied by emission of accelerated protons, 
electrons and heavy ion particles. The ions accelerated in this manner become the Solar 
Energetic Particles mentioned earlier. The frequency of flare events coincides with the 
solar cycle. The solar cycle is a major factor influencing space weather and has a period 
of approx. 11 years, divided into 7 years of solar maximum and 4 years of solar 
minimum. Increase in sunspots during solar maximum consequently result in a higher 
number of flare events than during solar minimum. Prominent flares can generate 
magnetic storms on Earth as discussed previously.  
 
                                                            
Figure 10: Solar Flare (Left) and a Coronal Mass Ejection (Right) [10] 
 
Another solar phenomenon that can generate magnetic storms and energetic particles is a 
Coronal Mass Ejection (CME). CMEs are huge bubbles of gas bound with intense 
magnetic field lines that are ejected from the Sun. The shock waves are capable of 
accelerating the particles to millions of km/hr. CMEs can disrupt the Earth’s 
magnetosphere and are believed to be responsible for major storms on Earth. They are 
usually associated with flare events but are known to occur even in their absence. 
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3.3 Radiation Detector Types 
Long-term exposure to radiation can be detrimental to a device. Monitoring the radiation 
using radiation detectors can therefore give an indication as to the expected device 
lifespan. The following units can be used to express the measure of radiation: 
 
• Roentgen (R): One Roentgen is defined as the amount of ionization required to 
produce 1 electrostatic unit of charge in 1 cubic cm of air at standard temperature 
and pressure. 
• Radiation absorbed dose (rad): Rad is a measure of the dose absorbed by a 
material. 1 rad is equivalent to the dose required for 0.01 Joule of energy to be 
absorbed per kg of matter. (The SI unit for this term is Gray (Gy). 1 Gy = 100 
rads) 
 
Several types of radiation sensors are utilized in spacecraft designs. Some of them are 
more suited at measuring certain types of radiation than others. Commercial detectors are 
mainly utilized to detect radiation from 3 types of sources: 
 
1. Alpha Particles: They are positive particles that are emitted during alpha decay 
and consist of 2 protons and 2 neutrons (helium nuclei). 
2. Beta Particles: They are basically high energy electrons or positrons usually 
produced from beta decay. 
3. Gamma Rays: These are photons having the highest energy and frequency 
(typically 1020 Hz and above) in the electromagnetic spectrum. 
 
Some sensors can also be used to detect non-ionizing particles such as neutrons. This 
section discusses the different sensors that are used in radiation measurement, along with 
their innate strengths and weaknesses. 
3.3.1 Geiger-Müller (GM) Tube 
The GM tube was used in the Explorer missions to measure the radiation in the Van 
Allen belts and is still widely used today. It was invented in 1908 by Hans Geiger as a 
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device to detect alpha particles. In 1928, he improved the model with Walther Müller, 
extending the detection to all types of ionizing radiation. The GM tube is a kind of a gas-
filled radiation detector. Other detectors falling under this category are ionization 
chambers and proportional counters. The pulses produced by the tube are usually counted 
by a microcontroller or a CMOS counter to quantify the surrounding radiation 
environment. Figure 11 shows a typical GM circuit. 
 
Amplifier
To Counter
Ionizing Radiation
Anode
CathodeInert Gas (Ne,Ar) 
+ Quench Agent 
(Halogen)
End Window High Voltage 
Source
GM Tube
  
Figure 11: Geiger-Müller Tube Circuit Diagram 
 
The outer surface of the tube is made of a conducting material like stainless steel that acts 
as the cathode. The anode consists of a thin metal wire lying along the central axis of the 
tube. The tube is filled with an inert gas such as neon or argon [20]. The tube shown here 
is an end-window type with the window usually being manufactured from materials such 
as mica, mylar, glass, or thin metals. Mica and glass are the most common types, with 
mica being more sensitive and hence providing alpha particle detection but also being 
more delicate. When radiation passes through the window, it ionizes the gas inside the 
tube causing pairs of electrons and positive ions to be generated. The circuit is completed 
when the electrons travel towards the anode and the ions towards the cathode. Since a 
detectable signal is required, the anode is kept at a high potential of typically 500 – 900 
V. This provides sufficient acceleration to the electrons to generate more electron-ion 
pairs through collisions, resulting in an avalanche effect and thereby producing a large 
pulse at the output. To prevent a continuous discharge a process called quenching is 
employed. This involves either providing extra circuitry, or filling up the tube with a 
quenching gas such as alcohol vapor or a halogen. The second method is fairly effective 
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and is generally preferred. Also, halogen gas is normally used since it has a longer 
lifetime than alcohol, which gradually gets broken down due to the discharge process. 
Quenching correctly associates each pulse with a single particle. Depending on the pulse 
amplitude, an amplifier might be necessary before feeding the pulses to a microprocessor 
or other counting device. Current limiting resistors are usually needed when connecting 
the high-voltage source; moreover a small capacitor blocks the output from the high-
voltage source while transmitting the pulses. Additional components might include a 
collimator that is used to prevent the tube from saturating in intense radiation regions by 
limiting its field of vision [6]. Though being relatively easy to use, a known downside 
that these detectors have is that they cannot discriminate between particles of different 
energies. A fixed-amplitude output pulse is generated as long as the particle energy is 
above the threshold for the tube. This can be countered by using highly sensitive 
detectors such as scintillators that are capable of producing pulses of different amplitudes 
based on incident particle energy. 
 
 
Figure 12: Different Types of Geiger-Müller Tubes. Thin Wall (Hot Dog-Type) (Left), 
End-Window (Center) and Pancake Style (Right) [51] 
 
GM tubes are robust, cost-effective, and are frequently used for general-purpose radiation 
detection. They can even be modified to detect neutrons by filling the tube with boron 
trifluoride gas or providing an inner lining of boron. The interaction with boron nuclei 
result in alpha particle generation which can consequently be detected. GM tubes can be 
fairly small and light-weight and can come in different configurations. Figure 12 [51], 
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shows 3 kinds of GM tubes manufactured by LND, INC™ and arranged from left to right 
by increasing order of sensitivity. 
 
• Thin Wall (Hot Dog-Type): These are mainly used to detect beta and gamma 
radiation. They are tough and inexpensive but usually have a lower sensitivity and 
are unable to detect alpha particles.  
• End-Window: They are more sensitive than the hot dog type, and can detect 
alpha radiation due to the addition of the mica/glass window. They can also come 
in reasonably small sizes. However, they are slightly more expensive and the 
window is rather delicate. 
• Pancake Style: The large mica window gives them a much better sensitivity than 
the other two types particularly to low energy gamma photons. However they are 
bulkier and can be quite heavy (the model shown in the Figure is more than 20 
times heavier than the end-window type). Another shortcoming is that since the 
window occupies nearly one entire side of the tube, they can be very fragile. 
 
Overall the end-window type offers a good balance in terms of cost, sensitivity and size. 
The model shown in the Figure is also the same one used in the MEROPE project [6]. It 
is 35 mm long, with an 8.7 mm diameter and weighs only 6 grams. MEROPE was a 
CubeSat developed at Montana State University that aimed at reproducing the Explorer I 
mission, i.e. measure the radiation in the Van Allen belts using a Geiger tube. It was set 
for launch on July 26, 2006 but unfortunately the Dnepr Soviet missile it was riding on 
crashed shortly after launch. The efficacy of the design in measuring the radiation in the 
belts could therefore not be determined. However, GM tubes have been successfully used 
in numerous missions and as such are an especially viable option for our model. 
3.3.2 Scintillators 
Scintillation is the term used for a flash of light produced in a phosphor when it absorbs a 
photon or an ionizing particle. This is the basic principle on which scintillators work. 
When a charged particle or energetic photon enters the scintillation material, it transfers 
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its kinetic energy to the medium by exciting atomic electrons to higher energy levels.  
This energy is released as light in the visible or ultra-violet spectrum by the electron 
when it returns to a lower energy state. A photoelectric transducer such as a 
photomultiplier tube (PMT) then converts this to an electrical pulse. This is illustrated by 
a typical diagram of a scintillation counter in Figure 13 [20], showing how these 
detectors would normally be used for measurement applications. The scintillator output is 
optically coupled to a PMT through a light tube. Since the light emitted by the scintillator 
is proportional to the energy of the incident particle, they differ from GM tubes in that 
they can not only detect an ionizing particle but also provide a measure of its energy. The 
pulses from the PMT are provided to a multi-channel analyzer that records the pulse 
amplitude and a counter then provides a measure of the particle count. 
 
Radiation
PMT
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Source
Multi-channel 
Analyzer
Pre-Amplifier 
and/or 
Amplifier
Counter
Scintillator
Reflector
Light Tube 
(optical 
coupling)
 
Figure 13: Typical Scintillator Detector Arrangement 
 
Measurement of gamma radiation is an indirect process that requires the generation of 
charged particles. Gamma photons interacting with the atoms of the material can either 
directly or indirectly, through Compton scattering or photoelectric processes, produce 
electrons or positrons that are then detected through the normal process. 
 
The sensing element can be of different materials namely liquids, crystalline solids, or 
plastics. The main requirements are that the material should be transparent to its own 
emitted radiation and that it should be efficient in energy conversion. The materials that 
are most commonly used can be divided into two categories: 
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1. Organic Materials 
Organic materials are characterized as having a fast response due to short 
luminescence decay times in order of a few nanoseconds. They are however not very 
efficient. Materials in this category can be further classified into 3 types:  
 
• Liquids: The sensing material in this group consists of a primary scintillator 
(solvent), a fluor and sometimes an additional emulsifier [52]. The fluor acts as a 
wave shifter, absorbing the light emitted by the solvent (usually in the UV 
spectrum) and shifting it to a different wavelength to ease detection. The entire 
mixture is known as a ‘cocktail’. Materials such as p-phenylene oxide, p-
terphenyl and benzene can be used as solvents while the fluor includes substances 
such as 2-methoxyethanol, toluene etc. Liquid scintillation counting has an 
inherent disadvantage in that in order to detect radiation the radioactive sample 
needs to be dissolved in the cocktail. 
• Plastics: Plastic scintillators have a similar material configuration consisting of a 
polymer base such as polystyrene or polyvinyl toluene and a fluor. They are 
inexpensive, robust and are capable of measuring α, β, γ or fast neutron particle 
radiations. They are however susceptible to degradation. 
• Crystals: Naphthalene was one of the earlier organic crystals to be used as 
scintillators. Most current scintillators though are made of anthracene or stilbene 
crystals. Anthracene is known to have the best efficiency among all organic 
scintillator materials [53]. Nonetheless, it is difficult to purify and its efficiency is 
still just one-third of NaI(Tl). 
2. Inorganic Crystals 
Inorganic crystals are widely used these days since they have excellent efficiencies 
due to higher densities and high-Z values of the constituent elements. Most of them 
however have slow response times, limiting their effectiveness in high-flux 
environments. Alkali halide salts such as sodium iodide (NaI) or cesium iodide (CsI) 
are the most commonly used materials. Impurities called ‘activators’ are sometimes 
added to improve efficiency of light emission usually in the form of thallium (Tl) to 
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create NaI(Tl) and CsI(Tl) respectively. Glass is also sometimes used to build 
scintillators. NaI(Tl) has a high efficiency and a near linear energy response, but it is 
hygroscopic and vulnerable to mechanical shock [54].  
 
A comparison between several common scintillator materials is listed in Table 2 [26]. 
NaI(Tl) has the highest efficiency but its decay time is 2 orders of magnitude more than 
that of organic materials, hence the material selection needs to be dependent on the 
implementing application.  
 
Table 2: Comparison between Commonly-Used Scintillator Materials 
Properties NaI(Tl) CsI(T1) Glass Liquid Plastic 
Density (g/cm3) 3.67 4.51 ~3.5 0.9 1.03 
Relative Light Output  1.00 0.45 0.15 0.4 0.25 
Radiation Length (cm)  2.59 1.85 4 ~45 40 
Luminescence (nm)  410 530 395 425 400 
Decay Time (ns)  230 1000 100 2 2 
Refractive index  1.85 1.80 1.55 1.50 1.58 
Hygroscopic  Yes Slightly No No No 
 
The main advantages of scintillators over GM tubes are a higher sensitivity and the 
ability to discriminate between different energy levels. On the other hand, they are 
significantly more expensive and their operation is relatively more complex. In terms of 
resolution, semiconductor detectors are far superior to either of the two. 
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3.3.3 Semiconductor Detectors 
Semiconductor or solid-state detectors operate on a similar mechanism as gaseous 
ionization detectors in that they rely on particle interactions for the detection process. 
They can provide excellent resolution and response times and can be rather compact. 
However, they have a lower sensitivity when compared to scintillators and are as yet not 
as widespread as GM tubes. They can also be fairly expensive. Different types of these 
detectors exist with the basic operation remaining the same. The major ones are examined 
below. 
3.3.3.1 Intrinsic Semiconductors  
This is the simplest arrangement for the device to act as a detector, and it essentially 
consists of a pure semiconductor crystal (typically silicon (Si) or germanium (Ge)). When 
a charged particle passes through the device, the energy it loses in its path is used in the 
generation of electron-hole pairs. The detectors are normally placed between two 
electrodes with an applied electric potential. This prevents the charge carriers from 
recombining and their resultant drift due to the field creates an output pulse. Since the 
energy required to produce an electron-hole pair is a function of the band-gap energy of 
the material EG and is constant (EG = 3.6 eV (Si) and EG = 2.9 eV (Ge)), the number of 
pairs generated gives a direct measure of the energy of the incident particle. Hence the 
amplitude of the output pulse is proportional to the particle energy. Moreover the energy 
required to generate the charge carriers is significantly less when compared to gaseous 
detectors (~30 eV), which results in a better energy resolution.  
 
A known complexity can arise if residual impurities are present in the Si/Ge crystals 
since this results in a low resistivity [19]. This inhibits it from detecting low currents 
generated from smaller particle concentrations. Nonetheless, improvements in modern 
techniques have in recent years been able to provide highly refined semiconductor 
crystals. High-Purity Ge (HPGe) detectors are typically used these days mainly for 
measuring gamma radiation, but they are susceptible to noise due to thermal carrier 
generation and need to be cooled at cryogenic temperatures. Another solution is to use 
doping. A process known as drifting is used to produce Lithium (Li) drifted silicon 
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known as Si(Li) and likewise Ge(Li) for germanium. Li drifting helps provide impurity 
compensation [20] but Ge(Li) still needs to be cooled at liquid nitrogen temperatures to 
be able to provide functional gamma radiation measurements. Compound structures such 
as GaAs (Gallium Arsenide) and CdZnTe (Cadmium Zinc Telluride) are attractive future 
options since they can be operated at approx. room temperatures.  
3.3.3.2 P-N / PIN Diodes 
The detector in this configuration consists of a reverse-biased p-n junction diode 
normally in an OFF state as shown in Figure 14 [20]. When an energetic charged particle 
is incident on the diode, it provides sufficient energy to generate electron-hole pairs, 
reducing the width of the depletion region and eventually resulting in a current pulse. 
This is provided to an external counting/pulse height analyzing circuit. These detectors 
are normally not used to measure high energy particles since the depletion region is not 
very thick. They measure energies in the range of approx. 1.5 MeV for electrons, 20 MeV 
for protons, 80 MeV for alpha particles and only low energy gamma photons. The 
detector frequently consists of multiple elements arranged in the form of a strip. 
 
 
Figure 14: P-N Diode Detector Circuit 
 
The addition of an extra intrinsic region between the p-n junction gives a p-i-n (PIN) 
diode that has a better response. A larger depletion region also extends its range of 
detection to higher energies. PIN diodes are sometimes used to detect neutron particles by 
using a converter such as a polyethylene radiator [21]. The neutrons collide with the 
radiator resulting in the generation of recoil protons with energies proportional to the 
incident neutrons. These protons can then be normally detected by the diode. Figure 15 
[22] shows Si PIN diodes that are used to measure beam intensities at the European 
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Synchrotron Radiation Facility. They are custom-manufactured by Canberra-Eurisys™, 
having a sensitive area of 3 mm x 8 mm (width x height) and a fairly low leakage current 
(≤7 nA).  
 
 
Figure 15: Si PIN Diodes [22] 
 
PIN diodes have been used as rad-detectors in several space missions, some of which are 
listed below: 
 
• GeneSat-1: A NASA CubeSat project to study genetic changes in bacteria during 
spaceflight. 
• Galileo In-Orbit Validation Element-A (GIOVE-A): Developed in UK 
(University of Surrey), its goals included acquiring the use of the frequencies 
allocated by the International Telecommunications Union for Galileo and 
monitoring the radiation environment of the orbits planned for the Galileo 
constellation. 
• CORONAS-F: It was a solar observatory launched in 2001 as a joint effort 
between several countries including Russia, Ukraine, UK and the US. 
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3.3.3.3 RADFET 
Radiation Sensitive FETs (RADFETs) are inherently enhancement p-channel MOSFETs 
that provide a measure of the total accumulated dose in a material. In this case, the region 
monitoring the measurement is the gate of the MOSFET. When radiation is incident on 
the device, charge carriers are generated in the gate oxide region as seen in Figure 16 
[23]. Some of these are lost due to recombination. Out of the free carriers, the electrons 
are transported out of the oxide. The less mobile holes on the other hand travel towards 
the substrate, several of them getting trapped in the process especially near the region of 
the oxide-substrate interface. The net increase in the positive charge of the device results 
in a relative change (∆VT) in the threshold voltage VT of the MOSFET. ∆VT increases as 
a function of the radiation dose, and hence the total dose absorbed by the device can be 
determined. 
 
 
Figure 16: RADFET Operation 
 
The simplest approach to using the RADFET in dose measurement would be to operate it 
in saturation. The output voltage would then consist of VT and an additional component 
due to the bias current. The RADFET is typically operated in 2 modes – active and 
passive. In the active mode, the device is subjected to a positive gate bias which limits 
carrier recombination, thus increasing the sensitivity of the device. Devices in this mode 
are commonly used in radiotherapy applications. In the passive mode, the device has a 
lower sensitivity since it is operated at zero gate bias. This however allows large dose 
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measurements to be made, ideal for space dosimetry. Another advantage of this mode is 
its low power consumption. The response for both modes can be represented as [24]:  
 
∆VT = 0.04 D tox2 f (active mode) 
∆VT ~ 0.0022 D0.4 tox2 (passive mode) 
   
Where tox is the oxide thickness (µm), f is the fraction of generated holes that escape 
recombination which is a function of the applied gate bias, and D is the dose (rad). Since 
the first 2 are known device parameters, D can be determined. 
 
 
Figure 17: A 4-Transistor RADFET Chip with Bonded Wires to read the Dose 
Measurements [25] 
 
Although their resolution is limited and not as good as some other detectors, RADFETs 
are highly suited for high-dose space environments. RADFETs can be used as single 
elements or in integrated chips containing several transistors of different sensitivities, to 
differentiate between different radiation sources. Such a configuration is shown in Figure 
17 [25] which consists of 4 transistors manufactured by REM Oxford™, UK. 2 of the 
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transistors have sensitivities in the rad range and the other 2 in the Krad range. This is 
obtained by using a tox of 0.95 µm and 0.13 µm respectively.  
 
RADFETs are often times used with other detectors such as PIN diodes to give an 
appraisal of the total dose. The GIOVE-A mentioned previously consisted of this 
arrangement wherein two RADFETs were used for dosimetry, while a PIN diode was 
used to measure proton fluxes. As with the other detector types mentioned earlier, 
RADFETs can also be modified to increase their receptivity to neutrons, specifically by 
enhancing the gate region with a polymeric or boron loaded substance. 
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Chapter 4  
Single Event Upsets and Their Effects on FPGAs 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will take a look at single event phenomena including hard and soft errors. A 
detailed explanation of SEUs including their generation will be presented before 
observing their consequences on FPGAs. 
 
4.2 Single Event Effects 
This section defines the various effects one might encounter due to single event 
occurrences resulting from particles such as protons or heavy ions (Z≥2). These are based 
on the definitions provided by the Joint Electron Device Engineering Council (JEDEC) 
association [27]. 
 
• Single Event Effects (SEEs): Any observable or measurable change in state or 
performance occurring in a microelectronic device, component or system that can 
be digital, analog or optical, resulting from a single energetic particle strike. SEEs 
comprise SEUs and several other effects defined below. 
• Single Event Upset (SEU): A soft error resulting from a transient signal induced 
by a single energetic particle strike. 
• Single Event Transient (SET): A transitory voltage spike (change of state) at a 
node of an integrated circuit resulting from single particle collisions. 
• Single Event Latch-up (SEL): An abnormal high-current state caused when 
single energetic particles pass through sensitive regions of the device, resulting in 
(in most cases) loss of device functionality. 
• Single Event Burnout (SEB): An event caused by a single particle collision 
inducing a localized high-current state in a device, and resulting in its destruction. 
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• Single Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI): A loss of normal functionality of a 
device that unlike SELs, does not require power cycling to restore device 
operability or result in permanent damage as in SEBs. 
• Single Event Gate Rupture (SEGR): An event where a single energetic particle 
causes a breakdown in a MOSFET and a consequent formation of a conducting 
path through its gate oxide. 
• Single Event Hard Error (SHE): An irreversible change in operation from a 
single particle event normally resulting from a permanent damage to device 
elements. These are usually caused by events such as destructive latch-ups or a 
gate rupture. 
 
This work was mainly conceived towards studying the SEU. This effect will therefore be 
the object of our focus in the current chapter as well as during the development of the test 
platform discussed at a later stage. 
 
4.3 Other Radiation Effects 
Besides SEEs, radiation can result in other abnormalities in microelectronic devices. The 
two prominent ones are reviewed in this section. 
4.3.1 Total Ionizing Dose (TID) Effects 
TID effects are a result of cumulative charge deposited in the device material mainly in 
the form of trapped charge in the insulating layers. The absorbed dose is a function of 
orbit parameters namely time, inclination and altitude. This is a long-term radiation effect 
unlike SEEs, and arises primarily from electrons, protons and resulting secondary 
radiation in the form of bremsstrahlung photons. The electrons and protons mainly 
originate from the radiation belts, and from solar events (flares). 
 
TID can lead to device failure and its effects are seen as increased leakage currents, 
timing skews or threshold shifts. The RADFET, explained in Chapter 2, utilizes these 
very TID induced parametric shifts specifically in the threshold to provide a measure of 
the total dose absorbed by a device. Incidentally, the satellites that experienced solar cell 
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damage from the Starfish nuclear blast had failed due to intensified TID effects. TID 
damage can be partially reduced by shielding that provides some protection against 
electrons and low-energy protons or by enhanced manufacturing processes, as are 
employed for several rad-hardened ICs. Rad-hardened devices for space applications are 
in general expected to withstand a TID of 100-300 krad. The Virtex II QPro has a TID 
tolerance of 200 krad (Si). 
4.3.2 Spacecraft Charging 
Spacecraft charging is defined as the buildup of charge in the spacecraft. The discharge 
that follows as a result can cause structural damage to spacecraft components or can 
cause functional abnormalities. Depending on the location at which it occurs, this can be 
divided into [28]: 
 
• Surface Charging: Occurs when the spacecraft surface is charged relative to the 
surrounding plasma. This can either be absolute, where the charge distribution 
over the entire surface is uniform with respect to the ambient plasma, or 
differential, wherein different areas of the satellite are charged to different 
potentials. 
• Deep Dielectric Charging: Occurs due to charge buildup inside the spacecraft, 
mainly due to high-energy electrons causing charge deposition in dielectric 
materials. 
 
The plasma environment, high-energy electrons from the radiation belts or the 
photoelectrons generated due to solar photons, any of these can act as charging sources. 
Damage is mainly caused through arc discharges, which occur when the field buildup, 
resulting from differential or dielectric charging, go beyond the material breakdown 
voltage. The currents associated with arcing are particularly high and can result in 
permanent component damage through burnouts. 
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4.4 SEU Mechanism 
SEUs are inherently soft errors and as such non-destructive. In several cases however 
they can lead to SEFIs or potentially destructive errors like SELs. The SEU process is 
initiated when an ionized particle enters the micro-electronic material. The particle 
interacts with the material atoms during its passage, losing its energy in the process. The 
amount of energy transferred is given in terms of a Linear Energy Transfer (LET). An 
LET is defined as ‘the amount of energy lost per unit path length by a charged particle as 
it traverses a material’ [27]. Since the energy lost is proportional to the material density, 
LET is usually expressed in units of MeV-cm2/mg. The energy transfer, results in the 
creation of electron-hole pairs that drift in the presence of an electric field (funneling), 
generating a current pulse that induces transient charges. If this occurs in the vicinity of a 
sensitive node, the amount of charge deposited at the node determines the occurrence of 
an SEU. In other words, an SEU will ensue if the deposited charge exceeds the critical 
charge (Qcrit) for the node i.e. the minimum charge that produces a soft error. Qcrit is a 
function of the feature size, specifically Qcrit α L2 for a device feature size of L x L [28]. 
Hence feature size scaling in modern chips has also increased their vulnerability to SEUs. 
 
While heavy ions generate SEUs by direct ionization, protons typically do so through 
nuclear reactions. These can be in the form of: 
 
1. Elastic Collisions: Energy is transferred to a recoil (Si) nucleus. 
2. Spallation: Target nucleus is split into lighter particles and a heavy recoil nuclei 
ion. 
 
Secondary particles from either of these reactions can then cause SEUs by the charge 
deposition process explained previously. In case of spallation, the angle of incidence of 
the original particle also need to be considered, as the charge deposition is higher at 
certain angles. Given that neutrons are devoid of any charge, they rely entirely on either 
of these two processes for generating SEUs. 
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4.5 Factors Inducing SEUs 
This section will discuss SEUs from the perspective of the various radiation particles that 
produce them. The primary sources for these particles are the factors regulating the space 
radiation weather that were mentioned in Chapter 2.  
4.5.1 Trapped Particles  
The trapped particle population consists of protons, electrons and heavy ions trapped in 
the earth’s magnetosphere. However, due to the fact that electrons do not generate SEUs 
[17] and trapped heavy ions do not posses sufficient penetration power to do so, we can 
disregard them when dealing with SEUs.  
 
The high-energy protons in the inner radiation belt are expected be the principal factor 
governing SEU events for LEO satellites that encounter them several times a day. 
Shielding against them provides only limited protection due to the weight restrictions 
imposed by satellites. High density memory structures in particular, like SRAMs, exhibit 
low threshold LETs (LETth) to protons. The particle population is affected by the solar 
cycle and events such as flares. The number of trapped protons decreases during solar 
maximum and increases during solar minimum. Flares can inject additional protons in the 
belt, and can sometimes even lead to the formation of additional belts thereby increasing 
the probability of SEU events. 
 
A particular region of interest for LEOs is the South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA) shown in 
Figure 18 [29]. This region is located off the coast of Brazil at an altitude of approx. 500 
km and consists of intense concentrations of protons from the inner belt. Its existence at 
that particular location arises due to the earth's magnetic field being offset from its center. 
This results in the geomagnetic field strength being weakest in that region, allowing 
particles from the inner belt to extend lower into the atmosphere. The map was taken at 
approx. 560 km. This anomaly has caused failures in many satellites. The concentrated 
environment can bring about an increase in SEU events, or even enhance TID effects. 
The Roentgen Satellite (ROSAT) that provided this map had to turn off 2 of its particle 
detectors while passing over this region to prevent them from getting damaged. 
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Figure 18: The South Atlantic Anomaly [29] 
 
4.5.2 Galactic Cosmic Ray (GCR) Particles  
Protons and heavy ions originating from GCRs are another major source of SEUs. They 
are of specific importance to high-altitude orbits like geostationary or highly-elliptical 
orbits. In case of LEOs the radiation belts provide some degree of shielding from their 
effects. The heavy ion component in GCRs is of particular significance and it contributes 
to SEU events by means of direct ionization. The ions as such usually possess high 
energy levels and can even result in multiple upsets. Their high penetrating properties, 
especially in case of partially ionized ions, render shielding against them ineffective. The 
particle fluxes exhibit a similar dependence to the solar cycle as trapped particles.  
4.5.3 Particles from Solar Flares  
Solar flares, though having a very low frequency of occurrence, are still important since 
the particles they produce can have significantly high energies. Proton energies may go 
up to a few 100 MeV while heavy ion particles can go to even higher energies ranging in 
100s of GeV [17]. Heavy ion fluxes can in some cases be as much as four times higher 
than corresponding GCR levels. Another effect of flare events is that the geomagnetic 
storms they set off disrupt the earth’s magnetosphere. This can facilitate penetration for 
lower energy cosmic particles hence heightening the chances of SEU events. 
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4.5.4 Atmospheric Neutrons 
Neutrons are generally produced as secondary particles through cosmic ray spallation 
reactions in the atmosphere. They are mainly of concern for low (aircraft) altitude based 
systems, since SEUs in spacecraft are primarily from protons and heavy ions. Their 
energy levels typically range from 20 – 300 MeV [30] and some of them can be 
transported to ground levels. Neutrons dominate SEU events occurring at aircraft 
altitudes and are even known to affect electronics located at ground level. Apart from 
generating SEUs, neutrons can also cause displacement damage resulting in lattice 
defects in the device material. Shielding against neutrons is unfeasible since they are 
capable of penetrating several feet of concrete. The maximum neutron flux is at an 
altitude of about 15 km, known as the Pfotzer point. 
4.5.5 Radioactive Materials 
SEUs can sometimes result from radioactive impurities introduced in the microelectronic 
device during manufacturing. This is usually in the form of low-energy α-particles that 
are emitted from radioactive isotopes such as uranium-238, thorium-232 and their decay 
products. These substances are typically present as impurities in package molding 
compounds or in the chip metal. The α-decay can release particles with energies ranging 
in a few MeV and as such can generate a large number of charge carriers along their 
ionization path. This process is by and large independent of the altitude and is one of the 
sources of ground-based SEU events. Although current technology has improved the 
purity of packaging materials, trace amounts of such impurities are nonetheless present. 
 
4.6 Effects of SEUs on FPGAs 
4.6.1 Upset in a Basic SRAM Cell  
SEUs are inherently transient, and might go undetected in several cases. But in storage 
circuits like latches and memory structures these events get stored. The SRAM structure 
that commonly acts as the configuration memory for FPGAs is based on the 6-transistor 
storage cell. However, the cell is known to be vulnerable to SEUs [32], consequently 
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compromising the functionality of the FPGA. Figure 19 shows a possibility of how an 
SEU might affect the cell. 
 
The nMOS pass gates T5 and T6 are used to read/write values to the cell. For a write 
operation, bit is set to the desired logic, say ‘0’ and ~bit to logic ‘1’. The pass transistors 
are then activated via the RD/WR Enable line and the value is latched in by the cross-
coupled inverters. Similarly to read the state of the cell the pass gates are once again 
enabled. 
 
 
Figure 19: 6-Transistor SRAM Storage Cell 
 
Now suppose that the cell holds a logic ‘0’ when a current pulse from a particle collision 
arrives at node A. The pulse travels to the gate of T3 and if its magnitude is high enough, 
is capable of turning on T3 thereby pulling node B to logic ‘0’. The positive feedback 
ensures that the change propagates to the other two transistors, eventually resulting in a 
logic ‘1’ getting stored in the cell. If the structure originally held a logic ‘1’, then a 
similar event occurring at node B would result in a logic reversal. It is important to note 
that the occurrence of such logic changes also depends on the design and a particle 
collision might not necessarily result in a bit-flip. 
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4.6.2 SEU Configuration Error Modes 
As mentioned earlier, the FPGA memory is divided into user and configuration memory 
and an SEU can affect either of the two. The former case results in an undefined state 
getting latched in a register element. Though this might cause a temporary disruption in 
normal functionality, the original design remains unchanged. In the latter case however, 
bit-flips can cause an alteration of the logic and the affected area needs to be 
reprogrammed to remove the fault. Faults in this category can be either in the routing, 
logic resources or in the IOBs and will be further discussed. 
4.6.2.1 Signal Routing Errors 
The signal routing in case of SRAM-based FPGAs like the Virtex takes place through a 
component known as the programmable interconnect point (PIP). It is essentially a pass 
gate that controls routing between two wires in the device. SEUs can cause three types of 
failures in PIPs [33]: 
 
(a) Original
A B
C D
A B
C D
A B
C D
A B
C D
(b) Open
(c) Bridge (d) Conflict  
Figure 20: PIP Failure Modes 
 
Open: Let the fault-free mode consist of node B being driven by node A as shown in 
Figure 20(a). In case of an open failure type, an SEU hit can cause the connection 
between A and B to be severed as shown. This might translate to a logic resource being 
effectively isolated from the design. 
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Bridge: In this scenario, the connection A-B is replaced by a new connection C-B. Node 
B is now driven by a different driver causing an unknown change from the expected 
implementation. 
 
Conflict: The third type of failure involves a new link C-B being created while the 
original connection is still intact. The outcome is a signal contention due to creation of 
the wired-AND structure and an unknown logic value driving node B. 
4.6.2.2 Errors in Logic Resources 
Faults injected into CLB resources by SEU hits also fall into 3 categories based on the 
resource affected [34]: 
 
LUT Defect: The fault is caused in an LUT residing in a CLB element. Since LUTs are 
usually used to implement logic gates and other combinatorial logic, this can cause a 
modification of the logic function. Figure 21 illustrates this by showing how a bit-flip can 
result in a 4-input OR gate implementation getting changed to a stuck-at-one fault. 
 
 
Figure 21: An Example of an LUT Error 
 
 43
MUX Defect: In this fault, the SEU affects the MUX select signal thereby resulting in a 
different signal getting routed to the output. This is shown in Figure 22, where the output 
was originally configured to pass input Y, but the upset causes X to be selected instead.  
 
 
Figure 22: A MUX Defect 
 
Initialization Defect: The configuration memory consists of bits that are associated with 
the CLB initialization that are used to define the behavior of the block resources. For 
instance, the storage elements can be configured as edge-triggered D-type flip-flops or as 
level-sensitive latches. Another option would be to program the function generator to 
behave as an LUT, RAM, or shift-register element (for more information see [31]). 
Upsets in these bits can therefore severely affect the design. 
4.6.2.3 IOB Faults 
IOBs are used to specify the operation mode for the package pins. A simplified diagram 
of a Virtex IOB is shown in Figure 23 [35]. A pin can be configured in either of three 
basic signal modes – input, output or inout (bi-directional tri-stated). Other configuration 
options for the IOB include selecting the I/O standard (LVCMOS, LVTTL etc.), signal 
terminations (pull-up, pull-down resistors), specifying the signal drive strength and 
configuring optional storage elements associated with each mode. Either of these features 
is capable of being altered by an SEU.  
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Figure 23: A Simplified IOB Element [35] 
 
A particularly serious condition arises when an upset inverts the signal direction, as in an 
input signal getting transformed to an output, shown in Figure 24 [35]. The activation of 
the tri-state buffer controlling the output driver causes the output signal O to be routed to 
the same pad as the input. The likelihood of this kind of situation to transpire however is 
very rare and usually requires more than one upset. A test was conducted at the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory to study this for the case of single and two-bit upsets on a 
Virtex FPGA [35]. The FPGA consisted of 512 IOBs and a configuration size of 
5,962,944 bits. They determined that at least two configuration upsets were required for 
the IOB failure to take place. Further, with the assumption of a uniform upset 
distribution, the probability of this event occurring was 2.9x10-11. 
 
           (a) IOB as an input (simplified) (b) Altered IOB   
Figure 24: An Error in an IOB Element [35] 
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4.7 SEU Mitigation Techniques 
Radiation-hardening against SEUs can be done in several ways. It can either be 
inherently built into the device during the manufacturing phase or be realized by making 
modifications to the design. The most commonly used approach incorporates redundant 
components that reduce chances of interruptions in the operation due to upsets. 
Correction of an upset following detection is usually desirable to prevent accumulation of 
errors especially in the case of FPGAs where multiple upsets can increase the likelihood 
of SEFIs. This section discusses different types of methods that are commonly employed 
to cope with the SEU problem. One must be aware nonetheless that an overhead is 
always involved, either in the form of cost, power consumption, or area.   
4.7.1 Technology-Based Techniques 
4.7.1.1 Silicon-on-Insulator (SOI) 
In this method a different substrate consisting of an insulated SiO2 layer over a silicon 
substrate is used in place of the conventional silicon bulk substrate. Bulk structures used 
when fabricating CMOS-based devices utilize wells to provide isolation between adjacent 
configurations. These however increase their vulnerability to SELs due creation of 
parasitic transistors. SOIs provide complete device isolation, thereby eliminating the use 
of such well structures, and hence reducing susceptibility to latch-ups. They can also 
provide some resistance against SEUs by reducing the charge collection area. Another 
common type of SOI is called Silicon-on-Sapphire (SOS). In this case a thin epitaxial Si 
layer is grown over a sapphire substrate. Both SOI and SOS improve device resistance 
against SELs and TID effects and can also reduce the number of SEU events, but the 
fabrication processes are known to be costly. 
4.7.1.2 Epitaxial CMOS Process  
This is a widely used technique, though not as advanced as SOI. An epitaxial layer is 
grown over a highly doped Si substrate. The low resistivity resulting from the highly 
doped region, limits its charge-collection thereby improving its immunity against SEUs. 
This arrangement offers limited SEL protection since the parasitic latch-up elements are 
still present unlike in SOIs. 
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4.7.2 Design-Based Techniques 
4.7.2.1 Spatial Redundancy 
A classic example of spatial redundancy is Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR). TMR is 
a widespread method and is applied to several domains other than SEU mitigation. It 
works on the principle of using three identical design blocks and then voting on their 
results to detect failures. An output is obtained as long as at least two of the blocks are 
functioning correctly. If a module encounters an error, it is detected by the voter and can 
then be corrected by reconfiguring the block. The module can represent a physical 
hardware resource such as a processor or a board or can be redundant logic on the same 
chip. An apparent weakness of the simple approach described in Figure 25 is that an 
upset in the voter or in the input cannot be countered. This can be resolved by triplicating 
the voter, and supplying the input from three identical computations through different 
paths.  
 
 
Figure 25: TMR Block Diagram 
 
A derivative of the TMR can be used to detect and correct SEUs for state-dependent logic 
such as counters and is shown in Figure 26 [36]. This scheme uses three voters and also 
protects the circuit against the accumulation of faults. Counters can be permanently 
knocked out of sequence by an SEU that affects its current state. Voter circuits only 
detect SEU events and fault-tolerance is provided by voting out the faulty sector. 
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However in case of counters, the affected slice needs to be restored to the correct state 
before an upset in another logic segment results in a faulty output. This is done in Figure 
26 where a feedback path from the voter output refreshes the counter to the correct state. 
The clock signal is also triplicated to further improve its robustness. An evident tradeoff 
associated with TMR is the imposed area penalty (~3x). 
 
 
Figure 26: Implementation of TMR for State-Dependent Logic [36] 
 
4.7.2.2 Temporal Redundancy 
A variant of TMR provides redundancy in the time domain. This technique is generally 
used to offer mitigation against SETs in inputs or in combinatorial logic. It functions by 
sampling the signal at different time periods as shown in Figure 27. A delay element is 
added to CLKA and is used to clock elements B and C. Assuming positive edge-triggered 
flip-flops, if an SET is present in the input during the rising edge of CLKA, it gets latched 
in block A. However, the transient dies off before blocks B and C get affected and hence 
the error can be voted out. The time delay ∆t is crucial for the proper operation of this 
circuit and must be chosen based on the maximum expected width of the SET. This 
scheme requires fewer elements than spatial TMR, but pays the price in terms of a lower 
speed, which is at least twice the anticipated SET pulse width. 
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Figure 27: An Example of Temporal Redundancy 
 
 
Figure 28: A Temporal Sampling Latch [37] 
 
A different approach called the temporal sampling latch makes use of both temporal and 
spatial redundancy to provide better immunity against data SEU and SET events [37]. 
This design also provides protection against SETs in the clock signals. The circuit 
consists of nine level sensitive latches as shown in Figure 28. Clocks B through D are 
phase shifted versions of CLKA providing the time-based redundancy, while the spatial 
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redundancy is provided by the three parallel paths. While an improvement from the 
previous methods, it also inherits weaknesses from both. 
4.7.2.3 Scrubbing 
Scrubbing is a technique used primarily in SRAM-based FPGAs to prevent accumulation 
of errors. This method uses inherent functions of these devices like 
readback/reconfiguration to provide SEU mitigation. This is done in two phases – 
detection and correction. Detection involves performing a readback operation that reads 
back the current data present in the configuration memory. A bit-by-bit comparison is 
then carried out between the readback file and the original (golden) bitstream to 
determine the number and position of the upsets. The device is then ‘scrubbed’ to remove 
the faults by reconfiguring the device with the golden configuration.   
 
Several modifications to this flow can be made to speed up the process. The easiest way 
is to skip the detection phase altogether and scrub the device periodically at a predefined 
rate called the ‘scrub rate’. This has the added advantage of faster upset correction as well 
as a reduced overhead, since the detection process requires additional memory to perform 
the comparison. This method can be used if the only concern is to avoid accretion of 
faults. 
 
In Virtex devices, the configuration memory is organized in the form of one-bit vertical 
frames as shown in Figure 29 [38]. These are the smallest addressable components for 
read/write operations involving the configuration memory. A scheme developed at the 
Los Alamos National Laboratory uses each of these frames to calculate a corresponding 
16-bit CRC value [39]. These are then used during the comparison process to determine 
SEU occurrences. This methodology reduces the computation and memory required with 
respect to the normal scrubbing process. Many of the current FPGAs such as the Virtex II 
permit partial reconfiguration/readback. This gives the designer the option to scrub only 
affected frames instead of the entire device, greatly lowering the scrubbing duration. 
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Figure 29: Configuration Frames in the Virtex II [38] 
 
The scrub rate needs to be carefully selected depending on the estimated SEU rate. 
Ideally it should be high enough to correct a fault before the arrival of another upset. 
Based on the system requirements however, one might be willing to tolerate a few faults 
in exchange for a lower scrubbing overhead. Scrubbing is commonly used in conjunction 
with the other mitigation techniques discussed earlier, like TMR, to give a higher degree 
of immunity against SEUs. 
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Chapter 5  
Implementation of the XHWIF Interface 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the XHWIF interface that was developed for 
the Virtex II board used in this work. This interface is a key component of JBits since it 
makes it possible to use this tool with virtually any board that has a supported FPGA.  
 
5.2 JBits 
JBits is a suite of Java classes that provide an API into Xilinx FPGA bitstreams. It 
provides the lowest level access to the FPGA and can be used to configure CLBs as well 
as routing resources [41]. The bitstream is either generated from Xilinx tools such as 
Xilinx ISE or obtained directly from the device by initiating a readback. A major 
advantage of JBits is that the bitstream generation or modification is extremely fast, 
limited only by Java compilation times as opposed to the slow synthesis times of 
traditional design tools especially for large designs. 
  
A typical design flow followed while using JBits is shown in Figure 30 [41]. Since the 
entire implementation is in Java, a simple Java-based development environment is used 
instead of the traditional CAD approach. JBits communicates with the development board 
through an interface known as the Xilinx HardWare InterFace (XHWIF). Since each 
board has a different setup, a custom XHWIF port needs to be supplied for each one. This 
is done through the Java Native Interface (JNI) in the form of a C/C++ program. The 
program essentially utilizes a known standard such as SelectMAP or Boundary-Scan to 
access the FPGA on the board. XHWIF provides a layer of abstraction that enables JBits 
applications to run on different development boards without modifications. Once a port is 
defined for a particular board, it can be used to connect to it locally or even remotely 
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through a TCP/IP based network. Other tools such as BoardScope also utilize the same 
XHWIF interface to connect to the hardware.  BoardScope is a graphical debugging tool 
that can be used to probe and analyze FPGA resources.  
 
Board
User Code
(Java) Java Compiler
Jbits 
Libraries
.bit file
Output 
Bitstream 
(.bit)
XHWIF
FPGA
 
Figure 30: JBits Execution 
 
JBits can be used to create new designs or modify existing ones. Both applications 
require an input file (.bit) to be specified, either in the form of a null bitstream or one 
synthesized from a complete design. The resources are viewed in the form of a 2-
dimensional array of CLBs, each of which is referenced through a row and column. 
Settings for individual elements within the CLBs such as the LUTs and flip-flops along 
with their respective routing can then be configured to form logic functions. 
 
Previous versions of JBits provided support for the Xilinx XC4000 and Virtex families 
while the current release, JBits3 was developed for the Virtex II. JBits was originally 
conceived as a tool to support dynamic reconfiguration for run-time reconfiguration 
(RTR) based systems, an option that was not supported by the normal HDL or schematic 
capture based flows [41]. This has provided the means to develop powerful fault recovery 
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mechanisms. Design changes can be made on-the-fly to create redundant logic or specify 
alternate routing as a workaround for faulty or permanently damaged areas on the device. 
The IDEA lab here at the University of Kentucky has been actively involved in the area 
of dependable and fault-tolerant computing. Hence this function of JBits is particularly 
appealing and needs to be further investigated in future. 
 
5.3 Virtex-II Evaluation Board 
The board used for this work is the Virtex-II Evaluation Board manufactured by Avnet. 
Figure 31 shows the board and highlights the elements utilized for this work, namely 
[42]: 
 
 
Figure 31: The Virtex-II Evaluation Board 
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• A Xilinx Virtex II XC2V1000-4FG256 FPGA. 
• A Xilinx XC18V04VQ44C configuration EEPROM having a capacity of 4 Mbits. 
• Two 50-pin I/O headers (92 FPGA I/O lines, 4 GND, 2 clock and 2 VCC). 
• Header for providing JTAG connectivity. 
• Eight discrete LEDs and two push-buttons for testing. 
• Status LEDs (power and ‘DONE’). 
• A push-button for initiating a configuration reset. 
• A jumper header for configuration mode selection. 
• A 40 MHz oscillator that supplies the global clock to the FPGA. 
 
The board features several other options that were not used such as an RS-232 serial port, 
DIP switches, a digital thermometer, MICTOR connectors for logic analyzer support, etc. 
Three of the five configuration modes supported by the FPGA can be selected using the 
jumpers on the mode select header as shown in Table 3 (M0 at leftmost position). 
SelectMAP is an 8-bit wide parallel configuration mode, which although supported by 
the PROM, has not been enabled on the board. The master/slave serial modes allow the 
FPGA to be configured from the EEPROM, while boundary-scan can be used to program 
the FPGA from an external off-board source. The boundary-scan mode was selected to 
access the FPGA and will be discussed in the next section. 
 
Table 3: Board Configuration Mode Settings 
Configuration Mode M0 M1 M2 
Master Serial Open Open Open 
Slave Serial Jumpered Jumpered Jumpered 
Boundary-Scan (JTAG) Jumpered Open Jumpered 
Master SelectMAP Not Supported 
Slave SelectMAP Not Supported 
 
 55
The ‘DONE’ LED is used to indicate a successful device configuration. It is driven by the 
DONE pin of the Virtex II, a configuration status pin that is actively pulled low while 
programming and released after the device has been properly configured. The 
configuration reset push-button shown in the figure is connected to the FPGA PROG_B 
pin. This is an active-low pin that is used to clear the configuration memory of the device. 
The board also has an additional oscillator socket in case a higher system clock speed is 
required. 
 
5.4 The Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) Interface 
JTAG or boundary-scan is the term typically used for the IEEE standard 1149.1. This 
standard was formulated as a means for testing and debugging devices and is supported 
by a large number of ICs today. In addition to using it for testing, many of the FPGAs can 
also be programmed through the JTAG interface. 
 
TCK
Device 
Core 
Logic
TAP 
Controller
ID Register
Config Register
Instruction Register
Bypass Register
TMS
TDI TDO
I/O Pins
Boundary-Scan 
Cells
TRST (optional)
 
Figure 32: Boundary-Scan Architecture 
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The standard defines a set of mandatory elements that need to be present for a device to 
be considered JTAG compliant. These consist of the Test Access Port (TAP), the TAP 
controller, the instruction register, the instruction decoder, the boundary-scan register, 
and the bypass register [38]. Other than these, devices can also support optional 
components to facilitate testing or provide additional services. The Virtex II for example 
has an optional 32-bit identification register and a 64-bit configuration register. The 
boundary-scan architecture is shown in Figure 32. The boundary-scan cells are used 
during an active test operation and collectively form the boundary-scan register 
 
The TAP connector is composed of 5 pins: 
 
1. TCK (Test Clock) – This is the JTAG clock that sequences the TAP controller 
and the registers. It is controlled by the device administering the test or 
configuration. The pulse rates need not be fixed.  
2. TMS (Test Mode Select) – This pin decides the state of the TAP controller and is 
registered at the rising edge of TCK. It has an internal pull-up resistor incase the 
pin is not driven. 
3. TDI (Test Data In) – This is the serial input line for the JTAG instruction and 
data registers. The register that receives the data is selected based on the state of 
the TAP controller and the instruction stored in the instruction register. The pin is 
sampled on the rising edge of TCK 
4. TDO (Test Data Out) – This is the serial output line of the JTAG interface. It 
supplies the data from the current selected register to the JTAG chain. Its value is 
updated on the falling edge of TCK. 
5. TRST (Test Reset) – This is an optional pin that is used to asynchronously 
initialize the TAP controller. When driven low, the JTAG register is disabled and 
the device is placed in a normal mode. 
 
The Virtex II TAP incorporates the first four mandatory pins in its TAP. In addition, it 
has internal pull-up resistors for TMS and TDI incase they are not actively driven. 
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The TAP controller is essentially a 16-state finite state machine as shown in Figure 33. 
The state of the controller is decided by the value on the TMS pin at the rising edge of 
TCK (shown adjacent to each state). The state machine is divided into two sequences, 
one for the Data Register (DR) and the other for the Instruction Register (IR). Once the 
register is selected, TDI or TDO is used to shift-in/shift-out data from it. A list of all the 
JTAG registers as well as the available instructions in the Virtex II can be found in 
Appendix A. A short description of the TAP states follows: 
 
 
Figure 33: TAP Controller State Diagram [38] 
 
• Test-Logic-Reset: This state brings the device into the normal mode by disabling 
the test logic. Depending on the device, the IR is either loaded with an IDCODE 
instruction or a BYPASS instruction. 
• Run-Test-Idle: As the name suggests, this state can be used to run a test, if any, 
associated with the current instruction. Otherwise the test logic is in an idle state. 
• Select-DR-Scan: This functions as an intermediate state to enter the DR scan path 
or proceed to the IR sequence. 
• Select-IR-Scan: This state is used to enter the IR scan path or else perform a 
Test-Logic-Reset. 
 58
• Capture-DR: In this state, data is loaded into the selected DR from parallel 
inputs on the rising edge of TCK. 
• Capture-IR: The current device status is captured into the IR in a parallel 
manner. The two least significant bits should be ‘01’. 
• Shift-DR/ Shift-IR: In this state, the DR/IR is linked between TDI and TDO. The 
captured value can be viewed through TDO while new data is being shifted in 
from TDI. When shifting in an instruction or a data stream, the last bit needs to be 
loaded while transitioning to Exit1-DR/Exit1-IR i.e. with TMS = 1. 
• Exit1-DR/ Exit1-IR: This state is encountered when exiting from a Shift-
DR/Shift-IR operation. 
• Pause-DR/ Pause-IR: This state can be used to temporarily freeze a 
data/instruction shift operation. 
• Exit2-DR/ Exit2-IR: This state givesthe TAP controller the option to return to 
the Shift-DR/Shift-IR state. 
• Update-DR: The data in the current DR is latched on the falling edge of TCK. 
This effectively updates the DR. 
• Update-IR: In this state the instruction in the IR gets latched on the falling edge 
of TCK, making it the current active instruction. 
 
5.5 XHWIF Implementation for the Virtex II Board 
5.5.1 The JTAG Scan Chain 
Developing an XHWIF interface for a hardware platform is based upon two key factors. 
The first factor is the number and types of devices present on the board that are a part of 
the JTAG chain, while the second is the communication standard used to access these 
devices. When multiple JTAG-compliant devices are present on a board, they can either 
each have individual JTAG ports, or they can be connected serially on the same scan 
chain. The latter arrangement known as a ‘daisy-chain’ requires just one JTAG port to 
access all the devices and is employed by most of the boards including the one in 
question. The daisy-chain sequence herein consists of the PROM followed by the Virtex 
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II as shown in Figure 34. The normal single-device configuration approach needs to be 
modified in order to be applicable in this case.  
 
 
Figure 34: Boundary-Scan Chain on the Virtex II Board 
 
 
 
Figure 35: Parallel Cable III [43] 
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 5.5.2 Host PC-Board Communication Interface 
The link between the host computer and the board is provided by means of a Xilinx 
Parallel Download Cable III. The cable provides a parallel port (DB-25) connection on 
the PC side and a flying-lead JTAG pinout (JTAG header) on the FPGA side. An 
alternate header (FPGA header) is also provided for configuring in slave-serial mode. 
The TAP pins map onto the Data and Status ports of the parallel-port interface as 
indicated by the schematic of Figure 36. All the pins are mapped to true logic. 
 
 
Figure 36: Parallel Cable III Schematic [43] 
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5.5.3 The Java Native Methods 
The XHWIF interface documents several methods that need to be supplied. These include 
methods to connect/disconnect, perform configuration, readback, read/write to on-board 
RAM, control the system clock etc. While the methods need to be defined for the 
interface to be created, a complete implementation for all of them is not required. The 
functions that are never invoked need only be implemented as dummy functions that at 
most return a value. The native methods for the interface were created in C++ using the 
Microsoft™ Visual Studio™ environment. The two key functions that were developed 
for this port were for FPGA configuration and readback. Other than these some functions 
were added to enhance functionality. 
5.5.3.1 Connecting to the Board 
The Connect() method functions as an initialization module before other methods are 
invoked. The function creates a JTAG Port object in order to control the JTAG interface. 
There is no specific instruction as such required to establish communication with the 
board. This function merely verifies that the cable connecting the PC to the board is 
working correctly. This is done via a ‘sanity check’, i.e. the IDs of the PROM and the 
FPGA are acquired and checked against their actual values. This ensures that the devices 
are working properly and there are no faults in the setup. A problem was encountered 
initially while getting the device IDs and a constant value of 0x00000000 was being read 
from the devices. The cause was traced to the tri-state buffer controlled by pin 6 of the 
parallel port (Figure 36) that was getting enabled by default and continually driving TDO 
low. 
5.5.3.2 Getting the Device IDs 
The device IDs reside in the 32-bit identification register and can be obtained by shifting 
in an IDCODE instruction (Appendix A) into the JTAG instruction register. The 
CheckIdCode() method used to execute this follows a multiple-device approach wherein 
it accesses the devices one at a time simultaneously bypassing the other. Since the board 
does not have provisions to bypass the devices in hardware, this needs to be done via 
JTAG instructions. The target device is loaded with the required instruction while the 
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other device is programmed with a BYPASS instruction. Once a device is bypassed, it 
acts as a 1-bit buffer by establishing a link between its TDI and TDO pins through the 
bypass register. It should be noted that the TAP state-machines for all the devices are 
functionally equivalent. A flowchart depicting the sequence followed to get Device IDs is 
shown in Figure 37. 
  
 
Figure 37: Flowchart for Fetching Device IDs 
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5.5.3.3 FPGA Configuration 
The SetConfiguration() method at present only supports configuration of the FPGA. The 
PROM is only used initially while accessing its Device ID and is otherwise bypassed. 
Configuration as well as readback in the Virtex II is managed by configuration registers. 
The registers are selected by individual packets in the device bitstream and are then used 
to specify configuration settings or handle internal signals before programming the 
configuration memory. Appendix B documents these registers and gives a detailed 
explanation for a few of them. Some of the commonly used data packets and packet 
headers are also provided.  
 
In case of the Virtex II, a configuration can either imply a normal configuration or a 
reconfiguration. From our perspective, a normal configuration involves configuring a 
device from scratch, while a reconfiguration is performed on a previously configured 
device without clearing its configuration memory. Reconfiguration involves some 
additional steps and can be performed while the device is still operating (active 
reconfiguration) or by first placing the device in a safe shutdown state (shutdown 
reconfiguration). A shutdown reconfiguration was used here since the first method can 
result in data contention and can potentially damage the device.  
 
Figure 38 shows the main steps involved in configuring the Virtex II. Note that 
instructions are loaded in LSB first while a bitstream shift starts with the MSB. The 
startup and shutdown sequences are identical and entail placing the TAP in the RTI state 
and providing a minimum of 12 clock cycles. Certain additional steps (not shown) are 
also involved while performing a reconfiguration. For instance, the device will ignore 
packet data until it encounters a synchronization word (0xAA995566). Also, in order to 
prevent a possible contention with previous configuration data, the AGHIGH command 
needs to be written to the command register (CMD) before programming the device. This 
places all interconnects in a high-impedance state by asserting the GHIGH_B signal. The 
current error checking routine makes use of an Instruction Capture as specified in the 
Virtex II BSDL file to monitor the DONE pin. This is a simple approach that only 
requires a few TDO read cycles. The pin can also be monitored by reading the device 
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Status Register (see Appendix B). This method was used initially for extended 
debugging.  
Yes
Initialize devices to 
TLR state
Method 
Invoked
Is this a 
reconfiguration?
Reset TAP by 
entering TLR state
Perform a Startup 
sequence
Load FPGA with 
CFGIN and PROM 
with BYPASS
Shift in the 
bitstream MSB 
first
Load FPGA with 
JSTART instruction 
(BYPASS PROM)
Return 
ErrorCode
No
Is DONE pin 
high?
ErrorCode = 0 
(Success)
Yes
ErrorCode < 0 
(ERROR)
No
Load FPGA with 
JSHUTDOWN 
(BYPASS PROM )
Perform a Shutdown 
sequence
 
Figure 38: FPGA Configuration Flowchart 
 65
5.5.3.4 Readback 
In addition to allowing the configuration memory to be readback, the Virtex II also 
allows the contents of the user memory elements such as the BlockRAM, LUT RAM, etc. 
to be examined. While useful for debugging a design, it is fairly difficult to identify faults 
in these bits since the contents constantly change based on the current state of the 
registers. Hence it was decided to ignore these bits while verifying a device readback.  
 
Similar to the reconfiguration process, the FPGA supports both active and shutdown 
readback. Again the former approach can cause problems by altering the user memory 
contents and was therefore not chosen for the current GetConfiguration() 
implementation. Figure 39 highlights the major segments of the function. The shutdown 
sequence operates in an opposite manner to startup and is signaled by the DONE pin 
being pulled low. In order to readback from the Virtex II, the Frame Address Register 
(FAR) must be configured with the first frame that is to be read, 0x00000000 in our case 
since we are performing a full readback. This needs to be followed by the amount of data 
to be scanned in the form of 32-bit words. Now the XC2V1000 consists of a total of 1104 
frames, with each frame containing 106 words [38]. This amounts to 117024 
configuration words. However the frame buffer pipelines the read data in a manner that 
the current frame is shifted out while a frame is fetched from the device memory, hence 
the first frame always consists of unneeded pad data and can be discarded. For this reason 
the Frame Data Output Register (FDRO) needs to be configured with a total of (1104 + 1) 
frames.  
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Reset TAP 
(TLR state)
Method 
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(BYPASS PROM)
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(BYPASS PROM)
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through TDO
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Figure 39: Flowchart showing a Readback Sequence 
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While performing the readback it was initially found that a status LED, used in the design 
to indicate that the logic operation had been initiated, would remain OFF although the 
DONE pin indicated a successful readback. Closer inspection showed that all the logic 
signals appeared to be in a high-impedance state. The problem was found to be that the 
GHIGH_B signal was disabling all interconnects. The LFRM command had to be used to 
de-activate the signal thereby enabling interconnects. Both partial reconfiguration and 
readback can be implemented with some modifications. For example, by specifying the 
address of the targeted frame to the FAR and changing the number of words to be read, 
only the contents of selected frames can be read back instead of the entire bitstream. 
5.5.4 The XHWIF Interface 
Once the native methods have been realized, they are supplied to the XHWIF JNI in the 
form of a library (in our case a Dynamic Linked Library (DLL)). The test application can 
then use an XHWIF object to communicate with the board. The Java test environment 
including the XHWIF interface was developed using the Eclipse™ IDE. Since the source 
for XHWIF was not provided in the JBits3 SDK package, a subclass was utilized to 
implement additional functions. 
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Chapter 6  
Testing Methodology 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The test setup utilizes JBits for performing both the fault simulation as well as correction. 
A simple form of fault detection would involve periodically performing a readback on the 
device, and scanning the bits against the golden bitstream for possible errors. However in 
cases when no faults have occurred this would waste processor computing time. A 
dedicated logic block was therefore created to perform the function of uncovering errors 
and provide a means of alerting the processor on detected occurrences. 
 
6.2 SEU Detection Logic 
SEU characterization in case of FPGAs can be done through two modes, static or 
dynamic. Both modes are used to determine the device SEU cross-section using known 
parametric models such as the Weibull fit [45]. The SEU cross-section is defined as the 
number of upset events occurring per unit particle fluence and is expressed in units of 
cm2/bit.  
 
In the static mode the FPGA is not clocked and the detection scheme merely consists of 
periodically reading the SRAM configuration memory for affected bits. This method 
cannot detect upsets in combinatorial elements or SETs. Also, the FPGA is typically 
expected to be performing some sort of function when integrated into a spacecraft 
system. Thus the detection strategy developed here was based on dynamic device 
operation. The approach described in [45] was used wherein identical shift register (SFR) 
slices were created and their outputs were constantly compared for mismatches due to 
potential SEUs. The SFRs were fed with a ‘checkerboard’ pattern (alternating ‘1’s and 
‘0’s) as depicted in Figure 40. Four distinct DCMs were used to provide the clock for the 
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SFR slices and their corresponding pattern generators. Upset detection can be carried out 
by using a minimum of two blocks. However a higher number of logic slices virtually 
factors out the possibility of upsets affecting the same stage of a redundant SFR and 
thereby going undetected. Once a fault is registered by the comparator, it activates the 
SEU_STATUS signal that can be used by a microcontroller to initiate a readback. After 
the affected bits have been recorded, the controller can then clear the register for 
detecting future upsets.  
 
 
Figure 40: SEU Detection Logic 
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The design was created in Verilog using Xilinx ISE. The lengths of the SFRs were kept 
large in order to use a greater number of resources (CLB flip-flops in this case). This 
implementation utilized 99% of the available Virtex II slices and 89% of the CLB flip-
flops. Alternately, resource utilization could also be increased by increasing the number 
of blocks instead of the SFR length. Since the emphasis of this logic was only on SEU 
detection, TMR techniques were not implemented. 
 
 
Figure 41: Screenshot of the Java Test Program 
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6.3 Test Procedure  
A test program in Java was created specifically for testing the newly developed XHWIF 
interface and for managing the faults in the bitstream. The program accepts the board 
name (implemented XHWIF) and the input bitstream as arguments. An options switch is 
used to instruct the program on the operation to be performed (configuration (c), 
readback (r), fault injection (f) and/or verification (v)). If the design bitstream is not in 
the program directory, a relative or absolute path needs to be specified.  
 
6.3.1 Phase I: Fault-Free Operation 
The aim of this section is mainly proof-of-operation. The bitstream generated for the 
detection logic is used to program the FPGA, and the same file is then read back from the 
device and verified. This flow is used to identify any bugs in the implemented native 
methods and to make sure that they are removed before carrying out any further testing. 
The content of this section will also serve as an introduction to the various aspects of the 
test program and the steps involved when verifying a Virtex II bitstream. 
 
The test application is invoked with three options (-cvr) and a relative path to the original 
design file. The program starts off by scanning the JTAG compliant devices on the board 
and displaying their device IDs. Although the board has 2 such devices, configuration 
and readback procedures have only been supplied for the Virtex II as displayed on the 
console: 
 
Connected to:  Avnet Virtex II Eval Board 
 
 
Found 2 device(s) with following DeviceID(s) in the JTAG chain 
 
Legacy PROM XC18V04: 0x5036093 (ID) 
Virtex II XCV1000: 0x31028093 (ID) 
 
Configuration/Readback supported for FPGA Device Type - XC2V1000, 
Package Type - FG256 
 
After communication with the board has been verified, the configuration phase is started. 
The application creates local copies of the necessary files from the specified design path. 
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These are namely a bitstream, and a mask file ($(DesignName).msk) that is utilized 
during verification. The XHWIF interface then initiates the configuration process by 
making a call to the SetConfiguration() native method. The total time displayed below is 
measured from the instant when the virtex2xhwif class makes the call till when it returns 
from the method. 
 
Creating a local copy of 'seu_tester.bit' and 'seu_tester.msk' in 
current directory 
 
 
Loading file 'seu_tester.bit' 
 
(Re)Configuring device... 
Done!!! 
(Time taken 30.875 seconds) 
 
The ReadbackCommand class of JBits can be used to automatically generate a readback 
command stream for the Virtex II, noticeably simplifying the readback process. However, 
using the class methods did not initiate proper readback sequences on the device. It was 
therefore decided to move the entire implementation to the corresponding native method. 
The bits that are read back are stored in a file in the work directory. As mentioned earlier, 
frame one is removed since it contains pad data. 
 
Initializing Readback... 
Readback successful!!! 
(Total time 27.479 seconds) 
 
Read a total of 117024 word(s) (Frame 1 scrapped) 
Readback data was written to file 'seu_tester.rb' 
 
Once a readback bitstream is available, verifying it against the original .bit file involves 
some additional steps. Not all bits in the readback data stream correspond to the actual 
configuration memory. The locations of interest are identified by the mask file. This file 
is structurally similar to the original bitstream except that the programming bits are 
replaced with mask data. If the mask bit is a ‘0’, the corresponding bit in the .bit file 
needs to be compared, otherwise if it is a ‘1’ the bit can be ignored since it relates to user 
memory or a null memory location. Now the configuration bitstream consists of a file 
header that stores the design name, device type etc. followed by a list of configuration 
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commands. The actual frame-programming bits are placed after these two blocks as 
shown in Figure 42 [38]. These blocks are absent in the readback stream and it only 
contains an extra pad frame at the beginning. Thus a prerequisite for the comparison 
process would be to align the actual frame data of all the three files shown in the diagram. 
Since the pad frame has already been removed from the readback bitstream, and since the 
mask file has a similar format as the .bit file, we only need to find the frame data offset in 
the original bitstream. This is done by scanning the commands block for the FDRI write 
command (see Appendix B) that marks the beginning of a frame data write process. The 
32-bit word that follows the command is the total write length in words i.e. 117,130 
(0x1C98A). The comparison process begins right after this word and ends when the last 
bit in the readback stream is reached. Notice that faults in user memory elements have 
been ignored. It is quite possible though that the detection logic on the FPGA might 
capture some of these faults. This can be useful in tagging such events when the 
verification stage fails in detecting any faults and further testing will be needed in this 
direction. 
 
 
Figure 42: Files used for Bitstream Verification [38] 
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If a fault is detected the bit is recorded in an error file. More particulars on the file will be 
given in the next section. The verification process is much faster since the speed is not 
limited by the parallel port. 
 
Verifying Readback... 
Verified!!! 
(Time taken 0.301 seconds) 
 
 
Disconnected from:  Avnet Virtex II Eval Board. 
 
6.3.2 Phase II: Fault Injection 
The fault injection process is inherently an RTR with a faulty bitstream. The FPGA is 
first loaded with the golden bitstream and the faults are then introduced by modifying 
individual design related configuration bits. The focus of the current test logic was in 
detecting SEUs in the CLB flip-flops and therefore the approach would be to target those 
bits that are specifically associated with these elements. JBits is particularly useful here 
since it can be used to handle each of the configurable attributes of the CLBs. 
  
To better understand this section, a more detailed diagram of a Virtex II CLB slice is 
shown in Figure 43 [31]. Either one of the several resources/attributes influencing the 
operation of slice flip-flops can be altered. For demonstrating the fault injection process, 
a resource that has been used in the implemented design is first selected. Consider for 
example the DYMUX element that controls the input to the Y flip-flop. For slice 3 of the 
CLB element lying at row 23, column 6, this resource is found to be configured to route 
DY to the D input of the flip-flop. The following method is used to modify this so that 
BY gets passed instead: 
 
jbits.setCLBBits(23,6,DYMUX.CONFIG[3],DYMUX.BYINV); 
 
Once the alteration has been done, JBits is then used to generate a faulty bitstream for 
reconfiguring the device. The active-high SEU_STATUS signal then indicates whether the 
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fault has been captured by the detection logic. For testing, this signal was monitored by 
routing it to a status LED.  
 
 
Figure 43: A Detailed Look at the CLB Slice (Top Half) [31] 
 
In order to determine if the incorrect bit is properly identified a readback/verification 
process is started next. Errors that are detected are logged by the program in an error file 
($(DesignName).err). 
   
Verifying Readback... 
Found a total of 1 error(s) 
(Total time 0.32 seconds) 
 
Error bit offsets were recorded in file 'seu_tester.err'  
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The file mainly logs the total errors and their bit offsets with respect to the start of the 
readback file. A few additional details such as the design name, device type, etc. are also 
provided in a header for future reference. The offsets are stored as 32-bit words as shown 
in Figure 44, where the final word block shows the offset of the detected error bit in 
hexadecimal. Assuming bit 1 at MSB, this can be interpreted as bit 5 of the byte at offset 
0x00010CFD in the readback stream. Now the frame data offset calculated for the current 
design bitstream was 0x9D (in bytes). Hence this translates to byte-offset 0x00010D9A 
in the configuration bitstream. This is found to be consistent when matched with the 
altered configuration bitstream. Bit offsets were mainly logged to aid in testing and can 
be omitted in the final implementation to reduce memory consumption. 
 
 
Figure 44: Error File Structure 
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Table 4: Fault-Injection Test Results  
Attribute Original 
Value 
Modified 
Value 
Detected 
by Logic 
Detected by 
Readback 
Verification 
Effect on 
Design 
Error 
Persists 
DXMUX BXINV DX Yes Yes (i) Yes 
DYMUX DY BYINV Yes Yes (i) Yes 
BXINV BX BX_B Yes Yes (iii) No 
BYINV BY BY_B Yes Yes (ii) Yes 
CLKINV CLK CLK_B Yes Yes (iii) No 
CEINV CE CE _B Yes Yes (i) Yes 
SRINV SR SR_B Yes Yes (i) Yes 
SRFFMUX* ON OFF No No - - 
REVUSED ON OFF Yes** Yes (iv) No 
SYNC_ATTR ASYNC SYNC Yes** Yes (iv) No 
FFX FF LATCH Yes Yes (iii) No 
FFY FF LATCH Yes Yes (iv) No 
FFX_SR_ATTR SRLOW SRHIGH Yes Yes (iv) No 
FFY_SR_ATTR SRLOW SRHIGH Yes Yes (iv) No 
FFX_INIT_ATTR*** INIT0 INIT1 Yes No (iv) No 
FFY_INIT_ATTR*** INIT0 INIT1 Yes No (iv) No 
* JBits did not modify any part of the bitstream when this attribute was changed. 
** Depending on current state of flip-flop and position of the set (reset) pulse 
*** This attribute resides in user memory of the FPGA bitstream 
Notes: 
(i) Containing SFR output stuck-at-0 
(ii) Containing SFR output stuck-at-1 
(iii) Corresponding signal out of phase 
(iv) None (error effect most likely transient) 
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6.4 Results 
The fault-injection process was followed for several other attributes that were expected to 
directly influence the flip-flop behavior. A more exhaustive approach might be 
conformed to in future where other elements are also considered, such as an LUT 
indirectly driving an input. Each of the test elements documented in Table 4 was carried 
out for five randomly selected CLB flip-flops for consistency. The attribute names were 
kept the same as their corresponding names in the Xilinx FPGA Editor for easier 
identification, while the values are from the corresponding JBits classes. Only resource 
based faults were tested in the present setup. However a similar approach can be followed 
for observing the effects of bit modifications in the resource routing. All the faults in the 
table were rectifiable through a reconfiguration with the ‘golden’ bitstream.    
 
Each of the attributes corresponds to a specific CLB resource/configuration setting. For 
instance, BYINV is identified as the MUX that immediately follows the BY input seen in 
Figure 43. When set as BY, the true logic of the signal is passed while BY_B passes its 
inverse. This signal is used to force the storage element into a state opposite to that of the 
SR (set-reset) signal. In the current design, SR has been configured as the global reset 
signal, hence BY functions as the global set for the CLB flip-flops. This explains the 
observed effect shown in Table 4 when this resource is modified. This signal is inactive 
(logic ‘0’) for all flip-flops except the one where the fault is injected. Hence, the faulty 
element is always in a ‘set’ state resulting in a constant logic ‘1’ at the output of the 
corresponding SFR. ‘Error Persists’ indicates whether the SEU_STATUS signal continues 
to remain active after the error register has been cleared. Faults in several attributes will 
remain dormant unless activated by certain signals. For example FFY_SR_ATTR decides 
whether a logic ‘1’ on the SR input will reset (SRLOW) or set (SRHIGH) the flip-flop. 
Detecting faults through the logic therefore requires the global-reset (set) signal to be 
pulsed. More information on the CLB resources (attributes) mentioned in the result table 
can be found in [31].  
 
The ideal case of error detection by logic and by readback verification was found to be 
true for most of the test elements. However one exception in particular, the SRFFMUX 
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attribute, could not be tested. Using JBits methods to modify this element did not appear 
to manifest itself in the generated bitstream. While this could be a possible bug in the 
current JBits package, it is also possible that this element is not present or configurable 
for the Virtex II device used here since, although it appears in the FPGA Editor tool, it is 
not mentioned in the datasheet.  
 
The REVUSED attribute is associated with the MUX element that routes the BY (BY_B) 
signal to the REV (reverse SR) input of the slice flip-flops. In other words, it decides 
whether the set input is enabled or disabled for a particular flip-flop. Therefore, to test the 
consequence once this attribute has been modified for the targeted element, one needs to 
pulse the global-set signal. This results in all flip-flops, except the one in question, to be 
‘set’. Now, if the flip-flop is already at logic ‘1’ this will have no effect, and hence will 
not be detected by the logic. Another constraint placed on the detection is the position at 
which the asynchronous ‘set’ pulse occurs. Since the flip-flop is updated on a positive 
clock edge, the fault might get overwritten by the logic of the previous stage before it 
gets a chance to propagate to subsequent stages. Detection of faults related to the 
SYNC_ATTR attribute also depends on a more or less similar set of conditions. This 
attribute decides whether the reset and set inputs to the flip-flop are synchronous or 
asynchronous. 
 
The FFX_INIT_ATTR and FFY_INIT_ATTR attributes are special cases since they 
correspond to user memory locations in the configuration bitstream. Thus it was not 
possible to detect them through readback verification as was explained earlier. However 
the fact that faults associated with them are detected by the logic proves the assumption 
made previously, namely that it is possible that the detection logic might be capable of 
capturing faults in user memory locations. 
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Chapter 7  
Conclusion 
 
7.1 Summary 
This thesis described the SEU problem mainly from the FPGA perspective. SEU effects 
on COTS FPGAs need to be studied in detail if the capability of using such devices in 
space is to be explored.  
 
The JBits-based testing approach that was followed required the development of an 
XHWIF interface for the FPGA board. This interface was created and tested for any 
possible functional errors, and at present appears to be working correctly. However an 
issue is sometimes known to arise when a configuration is immediately followed by 
readback verification i.e. when the Java test program is invoked with the –cvr option. The 
readback bitstream seems to miss one bit during the readback that causes it to go out of 
sync when compared with the configuration bitstream. Although only a single bit is 
missed, this causes several errors during the verification phase since the alignment 
between the files to be compared is disturbed. Clearing the configuration memory and/or 
a power-cycle seems to fix this. It is possible that a brief interval needs to pass after a 
configuration before a readback command is issued to the FPGA and this needs to be 
further looked into. 
 
JBits was successfully used to simulate SEU faults in CLB flip-flops by modifying the 
resource parameters and reconfiguring the device with the faulty bitstream. Since each of 
the parameters mapped to single bits in the bitstream this could be assumed as actual bit-
flips occurring when the device is in a high-radiation setting. Most of the faults were 
detected by both the redundant detection logic as well as during readback verification. 
Once faults were detected, JBits was used to correct them through a full configuration 
scrubbing.  
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7.2 System Implementation 
The proposed implementation of the final system is shown in Figure 45. Among the three 
commonly used radiation detectors that were studied in this paper, the end-window GM 
tube would be a suitable option. In particular, the sensor used in the MEROPE payload 
would be a good choice since, being a CubeSat their design constraints would be similar 
to our own. If possible it would be ideal to have an additional RADFET, as it would also 
give a measure of the cumulative dose absorbed along with the particle flux. The detector 
module will require additional components such as a high-voltage source, amplifier etc. 
as were described previously. Also, the pulses from the sensor can either be counted by 
the microcontroller by means of an interrupt, or through an additional counting device. 
 
 
Figure 45: Proposed System Implementation 
 
The purpose of using JBits in the current work was mainly as a source of simulating and 
correcting faults. Although it has been ported to embedded platforms, the high memory 
requirement of Java might be a limitation. Since the final implementation will only 
require correcting faults in the FPGA, the program can be created in a C/C++ setting. The 
code forming the XHWIF native methods can be reused for this purpose to create a 
standalone C/C++ application. Apart from managing the configuration and readback on 
the FPGA, the program would also be responsible for carrying out the bitstream 
verification. This approach will reduce the memory consumption and increase the range 
of possible microcontroller options. The MSP430 microcontroller from Texas 
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Instruments™ could be used as the CPU, since prior experience with this processor has 
already been acquired through the KySat1 project. The link between the Detection Unit 
CPU and the Flight Computer can be provided through a serial RS485 interface. 
Selection of the PROM will be simplified if the program size is limited so that it can 
completely reside in the microcontroller memory. In this case the PROM will only be 
required to hold data pertaining to the FPGA and the same PROM that was provided in 
the Avnet board (XC18V04) can be used. A rad-hardened version, the XQR18V04 is also 
available, and it would be advisable to use this in order to prevent possible SEU 
occurrences. Depending on the process employed for readback verification at least two 
such devices would be required, since the mask file also needs to be stored. Another 
option would be to use the XQR17V16 that has a higher storage capacity. The processor 
can communicate with the PROM via the Master Serial mode.  
       
7.3 Future Directions 
The testing in this thesis was carried out using software simulated faults. However, the 
device that is selected for the final payload implementation may need to be tested in an 
actual particle accelerator facility before it can be deemed suitable for orbit. Apart from 
testing its susceptibility to SEUs, analysis also needs to be carried out for latch-ups and 
SEFIs. Another parameter that needs to be considered is the device TID tolerance, since 
their effects can severely compromise the device lifespan. Several experiments have 
already been carried out on the Virtex II. For instance, an analysis of the SEU 
susceptibility of the FPGA was carried out at the Texas A&M Cyclotron Facility [56]. 
The setup tested static configuration upsets through heavy-ion irradiations on a 
XC2V1000 device, the same one used in this work. The study found that for the elements 
probed, the saturation cross-section was approx. 5x10-8 cm2/bit, with upset rates of 
4.4x10-7/bit-day for the configuration memory and 1.1x10-6/bit-day for the block 
SelectRAM. Tests such as these can be used as references when devising the test setup in 
our case. 
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The elements in the current design including the comparator logic were all operated at the 
oscillator frequency (40 MHz). An alternate option might be to run the SFRs and pattern 
generators at lower frequencies while keeping the speed of the detection logic high. This 
configuration was not used since no changes were perceived to the detection through 
logic or readback verification results in Table 4. Also, several tests had already been 
carried out and it was desired to keep the results consistent. This might be employed in a 
future configuration and a possible change could be on its observed effect on the design 
and/or in making some of the errors in the table persistent.  
 
At present, the parallel port limits TCK to 260 KHz. However, JTAG permits a 
maximum TCK frequency of 33 MHz [31], and hence the configuration and readback 
process times can be considerably reduced. Another option is to use partial 
reconfiguration and/or readback. This was not used in the current implementation since it 
required additional design flows to be followed. However, using it can further reduce the 
process completion times to the fraction taken to access only selected frames instead of 
the entire bitstream. The test environment created here demonstrated fault injection and 
correction in CLB flip-flops. A similar approach can be used to probe other resources 
such as the LUTs or block SelectRAM structures, in which case a design that maximizes 
the utilization of that particular resource will need to be developed. 
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Appendix A 
Virtex II JTAG Registers and Supported Instructions 
 
Virtex II JTAG Instructions 
The instructions that are provided in the Virtex II are given in Table 5. The size of the 
instruction register (IR) also allows support for the relatively new IEEE 1532 standard for 
In-System Configuration (ISC) that is based on JTAG.  
 
Table 5: Virtex II JTAG Instructions 
Instruction 
Instruction 
Binary Code   
(5:0) 
Description 
JSTART 001100 Used to initialize the device startup sequence. 
JSHUTDOWN 001101 Initiates the shutdown sequence in the Virtex II 
CFG_IN 000101 Provides access to the configuration register for writing (configuration). 
CFG_OUT 000100 Provides access to the configuration register for reading (readback). 
BYPASS 111111 Used to bypass the device by enabling the bypass register 
IDCODE 001001 Allows the device ID to be shifted out through TDO 
USERCODE 001000 Allows the user specified code to be shifted out through TDO 
JPROG_B 001011 Used to clear the device configuration memory (same function as PROG_B) 
INTEST 000111 Enables the boundary-scan INTEST operation. 
EXTEST 000000 Enables the boundary-scan EXTEST operation. 
SAMPLE 000001 Enables boundary-scan SAMPLE operation 
HIGHZ 001010 3-states the output pins while enabling the bypass register 
USER1 000010 Provides access to the USER1 register 
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USER2 000011 Provides access to the USER2 register 
RESERVED All other codes Reserved instructions for Xilinx 
 
 
Virtex II JTAG Register Set  
The Virtex II features all the mandatory registers required by the IEEE 1149.1 Boundary-
Scan standard as well as some additional ones as given in [38]. These will be listed here 
for reference along with a brief explanation. 
 
Table 6: JTAG Registers for the Virtex II 
Register 
Register 
Length 
(bit(s)) 
Instruction Register 6 
Bypass Register 1 
Identification Register 32 
Configuration Register 64 
Boundary-Scan Register 3 per I/O 
USERCODE Register 32 
 
 
• Instruction Register: This register contains the current instruction opcode. It also 
captures the current device status during the Capture-IR state as given in the device 
Boundary Scan Description Language (BSDL) file. The significance of the bits is 
given below: 
XXXX01 
Bit 5 : ‘1’ when DONE pin is released (part of startup sequence) 
Bit 4 : ‘1’ if house-cleaning is complete 
Bits 3, 2 : Used for ISC 
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• Bypass Register: It is enabled after a BYPASS instruction. It acts as a buffer while 
shifting out TDI signals to TDO. The register is reset to zero during the Capture-IR 
state. 
 
• Identification Register: This register is used to store the device ID as defined by the 
JTAG standard. The format for the Virtex II is given as (31:0): 
vvvv:fffffff:aaaaaaaaa:ccccccccccc1 
Where, 
v is the revision code 
f is the 7-bit family code = 0001000 (0x08) for the Virtex II 
a is the number of array rows in the part expressed in 9 bits 
for the XC2V1000 this is equal to 40 rows (0x028) 
 
c is the company code = 00001001001 = 0x049 
 
The IDCODE for the XC2V1000 can therefore be formed as follows: 
vvvv: ffff fff:a aaaa aaaa: cccc cccc ccc1 
vvvv: 0001 000:0 0010 1000: 0000 1001 0011   (0xb) 
 <v>:    1     0    2    8     0    9    3   (0xh) 
 
• Configuration Register: This JTAG register enables access to the configuration bus 
after a CFG_IN or CFG_OUT instruction. 
 
• Boundary-Scan Register: It is essentially utilized for testing in combination with 
instructions such as INTEST and EXTEST. 
 
• USERCODE Register: It is used to hold a user-defined code that can be something 
meaningful such as the current version of the design, date when configured etc. The 
code is written to the bitstream when it is generated and becomes valid after 
configuration. 
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Appendix B 
Virtex II Selected Configuration Specifics 
 
XC2V1000 Device Information 
• Frame Count: 1104 
• Frame Length in 32-Bit Words: 106 
• Total Configuration Bits: 3,744,768 
• Default Bitstream Size: 4,082,592 (Configuration Bits + Overhead) 
• CLB Arrangement: 
o Total Slices: 5,120 
o Array (row x col): 40 x 32  
 
Packet Formats  
The Virtex II has two packet types for managing the configuration process through 
configuration registers. If the register access necessitates a large word count, a Type 1 
header can be followed by a Type 2. 
 
 
Figure 46: Packet Header Types 
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Configuration Registers 
The configuration registers included in the Virtex II are given below. Descriptions are 
expanded for selected registers (refer to [38] for a comprehensive explanation) 
 
Table 7: Virtex II Configuration Register Set 
Register Read Write Description 
FAR Y Y Frame Address Register 
FDRI N Y Frame Data Input Register (for configuration) 
FDRO Y N Frame Data Output Register (for readback) 
FLR Y Y Frame Length Register 
CRC Y Y Cyclic Redundancy Check Register 
CMD Y Y Command Register 
STAT Y N Status Register 
COR Y Y Configuration Option Register 
CTL Y Y Control Register 
MASK Y Y Masking Register for CTL 
IDCODE Y Y Device ID Code Register 
LOUT N Y Legacy Output Register (daisy-chain DOUT) 
MFWR N Y Multiple Frame Write Register 
KEY N Y Initial Key Address Register 
CBC N Y Cipher Block Chaining Register 
 
 
• FAR: The configuration frame is selected based on the address stored in this register. 
FDRI and FDRO processes require the starting frame address to be set in order to 
access the specific frames. The value in FAR auto-increments when total words as 
specified by FLR have been written/read out. The current command in the CMD 
register is executed each time FAR is written with a new value.    
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• FDRI: Frame data written to this register is used to configure the FPGA frame as 
specified by FAR. The frame data is pipelined through the frame buffer in a manner 
such that the first frame is shifted into the configuration memory while the second 
frame is being shifted into the frame buffer. Hence, in order to load the last frame, an 
extra pad frame needs to be written to FDRI at the end. The word following an FDRI 
write is interpreted by the FPGA as an AutoCRC. 
 
• FDRO: This register is used to read the contents of the configuration memory. The 
number of frames to be read needs to be specified in the packet header. This process 
is also pipelined, wherein the first frame is shifted out of the buffer while the second 
one is being read from the configuration memory. As a result the actual data begins 
from the second frame, while the first frame consists of unneeded pad data. This 
process does not produce a CRC value or utilize AutoCRC. 
 
• FLR: The frame length needs to be specified through a write to this register before an 
FDRI or FDRO process can start. The value written to the FLR should be in the form 
of (Actual Frame Length - 1) words e.g. for the XC2V1000, the value is 0x00000069 
words. 
 
• CRC: 16-bit CRCs are used to check for possible errors in data writes. A data write 
to any register (except LOUT) initiates a CRC calculation based on the data and 
address bits of the register. A write operation to the CRC register causes a 
comparison between the register value and the calculated value. If discrepancies are 
detected, an ERROR state is entered by enabling the CRC_ERROR bit in the STAT 
register and by holding the INIT_B pin low. CRCs can be carried out by writing a pre-
calculated value to the CRC register using a bitstream command or by using 
‘AutoCRC’, wherein the last word packet write to the FDRI is automatically read as a 
CRC value.   
 
• CMD: This register is used to manage the configuration process through specific 
command codes. The command is activated as soon it is written to this register. 
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Table 8: CMD Register Codes 
Command Code Description 
WCFG 0001 Write Configuration Data. Required before an FDRI write operation 
RCFG 0100 Read Configuration Data. Required before an FDRO read operation 
RCRC 0111 Reset CRC (register). 
AGHIGH 1000 
Assert GHIGH_B. Used during shutdown 
reconfiguration and readback to place all 
interconnect in a high-impedance state to prevent 
data contention. 
LFRM 0011 Last Frame. Used to enable interconnects by disabling the GHIGH_B signal 
START 0101 
Begin Startup Sequence. Startup sequence begins 
after a successful CRC check and a DESYNCH 
command 
SHUTDOWN 1011 
Begin Shutdown Sequence. Shutdown sequence 
begins after a successful CRC check or an RCRC 
command 
GRESTORE 1010 Pulse GRESTORE signal. Used to set/reset (based on user configuration) the CLB and IOB flip-flops 
GCAPTURE 1100 Pulse GCAPTURE signal. Used to load the capture cells with current register states 
RCAP 0110 Reset Capture. Resets CAPTURE signal after a readback-capture in single-shot mode 
MFWR 0010 Multiple Frame Write Register. Used to write a single frame to multiple frame addresses. 
SWITCH 1001 
Switch CCLK Frequency. Updates the frequency 
of the Master CCLK to the value specified by the 
OSCFSEL bits in the COR 
DESYNCH 1101 
Reset DALIGN Signal. Used at end of 
configuration to de-synchronize the device 
following which, values on configuration data pins 
are ignored. 
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• STAT: This register can be read using JTAG or SelectMAP and is used to check the 
status of several global signals. 
 
 
Figure 47: The STAT Register 
 
Table 9: Description of STAT Register Bits 
Bit Name Description 
0 CRC_ERROR 
CRC status 
0: No CRC error 
1: CRC error 
1 PART_SECURED 
Triple-DES decryptor status 
0: Decryptor security not set 
1: Decryptor security set 
2 DCM_LOCK 
Logical AND function of all DCM locked signals. Unused signals are 
‘1’ 
0: DCMs not locked 
1: DCMs locked 
3 DCI_MATCH 
Logical AND function of all MATCH signals. Each I/O bank has one 
MATCH signal. If all DCI I/Os un-instantiated in a give bank its 
MATCH signal is ‘1’ 
0: DCI not matched 
1: DCI matched 
4 IN_ERROR 
Indicates input data being clocked in too fast, e.g. when CCLK 
frequency exceeds FCC_SELECTMAP in SelectMAP mode 
0: No legacy input error 
1: Legacy input error 
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5 GTS_CFG_B 
GTS_CFG_B signal status 
0: All I/Os in high-Z state 
1: I/Os not placed in high-Z state by this signal 
6 GWE 
Global Write Enable signal status 
0: All FFs and BRAMs are write disabled 
1: All FFs and BRAMs are write enabled 
7 GHIGH_B 
GHIGH_B signal status 
0: GHIGH_B is enabled 
1: GHIGH_B is disabled 
10:8 MODE MODE pins (M2:M0) status 
11 INIT 
Reflects actual level on INIT pin 
0: INIT pin at logic ‘0’ 
1: INIT pin at logic ‘1’ 
12 DONE 
Reflects actual level on DONE pin. If pin is released by the device 
but held low externally this is displayed as low 
0: DONE pin at logic ‘0’ 
1: DONE pin at logic ‘1’ 
13 ID_ERROR 
Attempted to write to FDRI without successful IDCODE check  
0: No ID_ERROR 
1: ID_ERROR. (Assert PROG to rectify) 
14 DEC_ERROR 
Write to FDRI issued before or after decrypt instruction 
0: No DEC_ERROR 
1: DEC_ERROR. (Assert PROG to rectify) 
15 BAD_KEY_SEQ 
Indicates if encryption keys sent in wrong order 
0: No decryptor key sequence error 
1: Decryptor keys not used in proper sequence 
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Glossary 
 
Glossary of significant acronyms used in this thesis. 
 
API  Application Programming Interface 
BSDL  Boundary Scan Description Language 
CLB  Configurable Logic Block  
CMD  Command Register 
CME  Coronal Mass Ejection 
CMOS  Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor 
COTS  Commercial-Off-The-Shelf 
CPU  Central Processing Unit 
CRC  Cyclic Redundancy Check 
DCM  Digital Clock Manager 
DIP  Dual In-Line Package 
DLL  Dynamic Linked Library 
DR  Data Register 
EEPROM  Electrically Erasable PROM 
FAR  Frame Address Register 
FDRI  Frame Data Input Register 
FDRO  Frame Data Output Register 
FET  Field Effect Transistor 
FF  Flip-Flop 
FPGA  Field Programmable Gate Array 
GCR  Galactic Cosmic Ray 
GM  Geiger-Müller 
HDL  Hardware Description Language 
ID  Identification 
IDE  Integrated Development Environment 
IOB  Input Output Block 
IR  Instruction Register 
JNI  Java Native Interface 
JTAG  Joint Test Action Group 
JVM  Java Virtual Machine 
KySat  Kentucky Satellite 
LEO  Low Earth Orbit 
LET  Linear Energy Transfer 
LFRM  Last Frame 
LSB  Least Significant Bit 
LUT  Look-Up-Table 
MOSFET  Metal Oxide Semiconductor FET 
MSB  Most Significant Bit 
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MUX  Multiplexer 
NASA  National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
PIP  Programmable Interconnect Point 
PROM  Programmable ROM 
RADFET  Radiation Sensitive FET 
RAM  Random Access Memory 
ROM  Read Only Memory 
RTI  Run-Test-Idle 
RTR  Run-Time Reconfiguration 
SEB  Single Event Burnout 
SEE  Single Event Effect 
SEFI  Single Event Functional Interrupt 
SEGR  Single Event Gate Rupture 
SEL  Single Event Latch-Up 
SET  Single Event Transient 
SEU  Single Event Upset 
SFR  Shift Register 
SHE  Single Event Hard Error 
SOI  Silicon-On-Insulator 
SOS  Silicon-On-Sapphire 
SR  Set-Reset 
SRAM  Static RAM 
TAP  Test Access Port 
TCK  Test Clock 
TDI  Test Data In 
TDO  Test Data Out 
TID  Total Ionizing Dose 
TLR  Test-Logic-Reset 
TMR  Triple Modular Redundancy 
TMS  Test Mode Select  
UHF  Ultra High Frequency 
VHF  Very High Frequency 
XHWIF  Xilinx Hardware Interface 
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